What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play

American Economic Review

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 198-225

  Crawford, Vincent ^a   Broseta, Bruno ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001391260     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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