On the robustness of behaviour in experimental 'beauty contest' games

Economic Journal

Volumn 107, Issue 445, 1997, Pages 1684-1700

  Duffy, John ^a   Nagel, Rosemarie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001137963     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00075.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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