CEO Risk-Taking and Socioemotional Wealth: The Behavioral Agency Model, Family Control, and CEO Option Wealth

Journal of Management

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2019, Pages 1713-1738

  Gomez Mejia, Luis R ^a   Neacsu, Ionela ^b   Martin, Geoffrey ^c  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RENNES SCHOOL OF BUSINESS   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

agent risk taking; behavioral agency; family principal; mixed gamble; socioemotional wealth

Indexed keywords

EID: 85062564682     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206317723711     Document Type: Article

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