Determinants of contractual completeness in franchising

Contributions to Management Science

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 13-30

  Hendrikse, George ^a   Windsperger, Josef ^b  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; Environmental Uncertainty; Network Partner; Relational View; Specific Investment

Indexed keywords

EID: 85037075368     PISSN: 14311941     EISSN: 2197716X     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2615-9_2     Document Type: Chapter

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