Contracts as reference points

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 123, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-48

  Hart, Oliver ^a   Moore, John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42149087052     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: 15314650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.1     Document Type: Article

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