Strategic alliances: Bridges between "islands of conscious power"

Journal of the Japanese and International Economies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 146-163

  Baker, George P ^a   Gibbons, Robert ^b   Murphy, Kevin J ^c  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Strategic alliances; Theory of the firm

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649094473     PISSN: 08891583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2008.03.001     Document Type: Article

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