The law and economics of incomplete contracts

Annual Review of Law and Social Science

Volumn 2, Issue , 2006, Pages 279-297

  Scott, Robert E ^a  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

Author keywords

Commercial law; Contract theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846384719     PISSN: 15503585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.2.081805.105913     Document Type: Review

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