Relationships and hybrid contracts: An analysis of contract choice in information technology

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 207-229

  Kalnins, Arturs ^a   Mayer, Kyle J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344637334     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewh030     Document Type: Review

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