Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation, governance structure and firm performance

Journal of Business Venturing

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 257-279

  He, Lerong ^a  

^a NIAGARA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Founder managed business

Indexed keywords

EID: 39749154752     PISSN: 08839026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2007.02.001     Document Type: Article

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