Executive pay dispersion, corporate governance, and firm performance

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 315-338

  Lee, Kin Wai ^a   Lev, Baruch ^b   Yeo, Gillian Hian Heng ^a  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Corporate governance; Pay dispersion; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 39449094030     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-007-0053-8     Document Type: Article

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