The Paris Agreement as a step backward to gain momentum: Lessons from and for theory

Revue d'Economie Politique

Volumn 126, Issue 3, 2016, Pages 347-356

  Caparrós, Alejandro ^a  

^a The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bargaining theory; Climate change; Game theory; International environmental agreements; International negotiations

Indexed keywords

EID: 84983490961     PISSN: 03732630     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/redp.263.0347     Document Type: Review

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