Climate contracts: A game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 79, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1527-1557

  Harstad, Bård ^a,b,c  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Climate change; Dynamic games; Environmental agreements; Hold up problems; Incomplete contracts; Renegotiation design

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; EMISSION; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; INVESTMENT; MARKOV CHAIN; NUMERICAL MODEL;

EID: 84867811900     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rds011     Document Type: Article

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