China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 83-100

  Shum, Robert Y ^a  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; China; Climate change; Energy; Rising powers; United States

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; CARBON DIOXIDE; CLIMATE CHANGE; ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; ECONOMIC GROWTH; ENERGY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT;

CHINA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84893801066     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-013-9231-4     Document Type: Article

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