Signaling in international environmental agreements: The case of early and delayed action

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 309-325

  Jakob, Michael ^a   Lessmann, Kai ^a  

^a POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Climate policy; International environmental agreements; Signaling game

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; SIGNALING;

EID: 84867719767     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-012-9170-5     Document Type: Article

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