Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 11-12, 2011, Pages 1339-1348

  Beccherle, Julien ^a   Tirole, Jean ^b  

^a Ministère du Développement Durable ^*  (France)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Bankable permits; Cap and trade; Climate change; International negotiations

Indexed keywords

EID: 81055140586     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.007     Document Type: Article

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