Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 111-134

  Espínola Arredondo, Ana ^a   Muñoz García, Félix ^a  

^a WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

environmental agreements; non binding negotiations; non compliance cost; signaling games

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751606210     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629810391073     Document Type: Article

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