Family involvement and R&D expenses in the context of weak property rights protection: an examination of non-state-owned listed companies in China

European Journal of Finance

Volumn 24, Issue 16, 2018, Pages 1506-1527

  De Massis, Alfredo ^a,d   Ding, Shujun ^b   Kotlar, Josip ^a   Wu, Zhenyu ^c  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA   (Canada)

^d FREE UNIVERSITY OF BOLZANO   (Italy)

Author keywords

China; family firms; family centred goals; property rights; R D expenses

Indexed keywords

EID: 84976351127     PISSN: 1351847X     EISSN: 14664364     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2016.1200994     Document Type: Article

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