Insecure property rights and government ownership of firms

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 113, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 467-496

  Che, Jiahua ^a   Qian, Yingyi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039403204     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003355398555658     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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