How bad is incoherence?

Decision

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 20-39

  Arkes, Hal R ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^b   Hertwig, Ralph ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Coherence; Correspondence; Ecological rationality; Intransitivity; Propositional reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84971407552     PISSN: 23259965     EISSN: 23259973     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/dec0000043     Document Type: Article

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