Behavioral inconsistencies do not imply inconsistent strategies

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 2, Issue NOV, 2011, Pages

  Hertwig, Ralph ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856497169     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00292     Document Type: Note

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