Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 87, Issue , 2012, Pages 571-590

  Bozbay, Irem ^a   Dietrich, Franz ^b,c   Peters, Hans ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

^d MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Efficient information aggregation; Judgment aggregation; Private information; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84955356024     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007     Document Type: Article

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