A bayesian model of voting in juries

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 259-294

  Duggan, John ^a   Martinelli, César ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035193139     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0843     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. "Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem"
2. "Condorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors"
3. "Minority Voting Rights can Maximize Majority Welfare"
4. Condorcet Marquis de Essais sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues a la pluralité des voix
5. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Sincerity"
6. "The Swing Voter's Curse"
7. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information"
8. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts"
9. "Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity"
10. "Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective"
11. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes"
12. "Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees"
13. "An Experimental Study of Jury Decisions"
14. "Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Players"
15. "Informative Voting and Condorcet Jury Theorem in Models with Convex Signal Spaces"
16. "Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem"
17. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem"
18. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem"
19. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting"