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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 1464-1480

On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

(2) Goertz, Johanna M M a,b Maniquet, François b

a UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH (Canada)

b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN (Belgium)

Author keywords

Approval voting; Efficient information aggregation; Poisson games; Scoring rules

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960216882 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: 10957235 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.001 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (27)

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