Monitoring capabilities of busy and overlap directors: Evidence from Australia

Pacific Basin Finance Journal

Volumn 35, Issue , 2015, Pages 444-469

  Fernández Méndez, Carlos ^a   Pathan, Shams ^b   Arrondo García, Rubén ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OVIEDO   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

Audit fees; Audit opinion; Board; Busy directors; CEO turnover; Executive remuneration; Overlap directors; Pay performance sensitivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84947866945     PISSN: 0927538X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.05.006     Document Type: Article

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