Multiple directorships and acquirer returns

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 34, Issue 9, 2010, Pages 2011-2026

  Ahn, Seoungpil ^a   Jiraporn, Pornsit ^b,c   Kim, Young Sang ^d  

^a Sogang University   (South Korea)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY   (Thailand)

^d NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Board appointments; Mergers and acquisitions; Multiple directorships

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954144676     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.01.009     Document Type: Article

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