What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 341-377

  Brickley, James A ^a   Linck, James S ^a   Coles, Jeffrey L ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Board service; Career concerns; CEO compensation; Corporate governance; G32; Horizon problems; Incentives; L22

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000947671     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Bianco A., Byrne J. The rush to quality on corporate boards. Business Week, March 3. Number. 3516:1997;34-35.
2. Bizjak J., Brickley J., Coles J. Stock-based incentive compensation, asymmetric information, and investment behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 16:1993;349-372.
3. Blackwell D., Brickley J., Weisbach M. Accounting information and internal performance evaluation: evidence from Texas banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 17:1994;331-358.
4. Booth J., Deli D. Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by the CEO. Journal of Financial Economics. 40:1996;81-104.
5. Brickley J., Coles J., Jarrell G. Leadership structure. separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board Journal of Corporate Finance. 3:1997;189-220.
6. Butler S., Newman H. Agency control mechanisms, effectiveness and decision making in an executive's final year with the firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 145:1989;451-464.
7. Byrne J.A. And you thought CEOs were overpaid. Business Week, August 26. Number. 3490:1996;34.
8. Chevalier, J., Ellison, G., 1998. Career concerns of mutual fund managers. Unpublished working paper #6394, National Bureau of Economic Research.
9. Dechow P., Sloan R. Executive incentives and the horizon problem: Some empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 14:1991;51-89.
10. Fama E. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy. 88:1980;288-307.
11. Gibbons R., Murphy K.J. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy. 100:1992;468-505.
12. Gilson S. Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders. evidence on changes in corporate ownership when firms default Journal of Financial Economics. 27:1990;355-387.
13. Hermalin B., Weisbach M. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review. 88:1998;96-118.
14. Holmstrom B. Managerial incentive schemes - a dynamic perspective. Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck. 1982;Swenska Handelshogkolan, Helsinki.
15. Jensen M., Murphy K.J. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy. 98:1990;225-264.
16. Kaplan S., Reishus D. Outside directorships and corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 27:1990;389-410.
17. Lazear, E., 1979. Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy 87, 1261-1284.
18. Lazear E., Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy. 89:1981;841-864.
19. Lott J. Attendance rates, political shirking, and the effect of post-elective office employment. Economic Inquiry. 28:1990;133-150.
20. Mace M. Directors. Myth and Reality:1986;Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
21. Murphy K.J., Zimmerman J. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 16:1993;273-315.
22. Patton A., Baker J. Why won't directors rock the boat? Harvard Business Review. 65:1987;10-18.
23. Smith C., Watts R. Incentive and tax effects of U.S. executive compensation plans. Australian Journal of Management. 7:1982;139-157.
24. Smith C., Watts R. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics. 32:1992;263-292.
25. Sonnenfeld J. The Hero's Farewell. 1988;Oxford University Press, Oxford.
26. Vancil R. Passing the Baton. Managing the Process of CEO Succession:1987;Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
27. Warner J., Watts R., Wruck K. Stock prices and top management changes. Journal of Financial Economics. 20:1988;461-492.
28. Weisbach M. Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics. 20:1988;431-460.