CEOs under Fire: The effects of competition from inside directors on forced CEO turnover and CEO Compensation

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Volumn 48, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 669-698

  Mobbs, Shawn ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891663802     PISSN: 00221090     EISSN: 17566916     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109013000318     Document Type: Article

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