Political connections and agency conflicts: The roles of owner and manager political influence on executive compensation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 407-434

  Ding, Shujun ^a   Jia, Chunxin ^b   Wilson, Craig ^c   Wu, Zhenyu ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

^b Peking University   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Executive compensation; Political connections; Political influence; State ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 84943364337     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-014-0441-9     Document Type: Article

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