Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance

Journal of Business Finance and Accounting

Volumn 39, Issue 3-4, 2012, Pages 399-426

  Horton, Joanne ^a   Millo, Yuval ^b   Serafeim, George ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^c HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Board of directors; Compensation; Corporate governance; Corporate performance; Social networks

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859582450     PISSN: 0306686X     EISSN: 14685957     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02276.x     Document Type: Article

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