The relationship between underinvestment, overinvestment and CEO's compensation

Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2012, Pages

  Baxamusa, Mufaddal ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Entrenchment; Firm performance; Incentives; Investment

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION; INCENTIVE; INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE; INVESTMENT;

EID: 84867767057     PISSN: 02190915     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219091512500142     Document Type: Review

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