Executive political connections and firm performance: Comparative evidence from privately-controlled and state-owned enterprises

International Review of Financial Analysis

Volumn 36, Issue , 2014, Pages 153-167

  Ding, Shujun ^a   Jia, Chunxin ^b   Wu, Zhenyu ^c   Zhang, Xiaoqing ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

^b Peking University   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA   (Canada)

^d CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES   (China)

Author keywords

Performance; Political connections; Privately controlled enterprises; Ultimate control

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892683411     PISSN: 10575219     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2013.12.006     Document Type: Article

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