Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to stock returns: A discussion

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 193-202

  Dechow, Patricia M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Bonus contracts; Management compensation; Managerial power; Pay sensitivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746887447     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.11.001     Document Type: Note

References (8)

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