Capitalism and Democracy

The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Iversen, Torben ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Approaches; Capitalism; Coalitional politics; Democratic institutions; Democratic redistribution; Economic institutions; Economic system; Recent literature; Study

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925857023     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0033     Document Type: Chapter

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