Wage inequality and varieties of capitalism

World Politics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 350-383

  Rueda, David ^a   Pontusson, Jonas ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CAPITALISM; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 0033909515     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100016579     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. Cf. Michael Wallerstein, "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies," American Journal of Political Science 43 (July 1999).
2. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Soskice, "Wage Determination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (Winter 1990); and idem, "Divergent Production Regimes," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Soskice, "Wage Determination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (Winter 1990); and idem, "Divergent Production Regimes," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
4. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Soskice, "Wage Determination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (Winter 1990); and idem, "Divergent Production Regimes," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
5. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David Soskice, "Wage Determination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (Winter 1990); and idem, "Divergent Production Regimes," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
6. Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton jUniversity Press, 1990); David Soskice, "Wage Determination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6 (Winter 1990); and idem, "Divergent Production Regimes," in Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
7. In seeking to incorporate institutional insights into regression analysis, we follow the lead of Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, none of these works explicitly tests the idea that causal dynamics vary by political economy type. Previous work in this particular vein includes Philip O'Connel, "National Variations in the Fortunes of Labor," in Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks, eds., The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Duane Swank, "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
8. In seeking to incorporate institutional insights into regression analysis, we follow the lead of Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, none of these works explicitly tests the idea that causal dynamics vary by political economy type. Previous work in this particular vein includes Philip O'Connel, "National Variations in the Fortunes of Labor," in Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks, eds., The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Duane Swank, "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
9. In seeking to incorporate institutional insights into regression analysis, we follow the lead of Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, none of these works explicitly tests the idea that causal dynamics vary by political economy type. Previous work in this particular vein includes Philip O'Connel, "National Variations in the Fortunes of Labor," in Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks, eds., The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Duane Swank, "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10. In seeking to incorporate institutional insights into regression analysis, we follow the lead of Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, none of these works explicitly tests the idea that causal dynamics vary by political economy type. Previous work in this particular vein includes Philip O'Connel, "National Variations in the Fortunes of Labor," in Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks, eds., The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Duane Swank, "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
11. In seeking to incorporate institutional insights into regression analysis, we follow the lead of Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, none of these works explicitly tests the idea that causal dynamics vary by political economy type. Previous work in this particular vein includes Philip O'Connel, "National Variations in the Fortunes of Labor," in Thomas Janoski and Alexander Hicks, eds., The Comparative Political Economy of the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Duane Swank, "Political Institutions and Welfare State Restructuring," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
12. Cf. Wallerstein (fn. 1), 649; OECD, Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (OECD, 1995); and Peter Gottschalk and Timothy Smeeding, "Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (June 1997). For further specifications of the wage data used here, see OECD, "Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility," Employment Outlook (July 1996).
13. Cf. Wallerstein (fn. 1), 649; OECD, Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (OECD, 1995); and Peter Gottschalk and Timothy Smeeding, "Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (June 1997). For further specifications of the wage data used here, see OECD, "Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility," Employment Outlook (July 1996).
14. Cf. Wallerstein (fn. 1), 649; OECD, Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (OECD, 1995); and Peter Gottschalk and Timothy Smeeding, "Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (June 1997). For further specifications of the wage data used here, see OECD, "Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility," Employment Outlook (July 1996).
15. Cf. Wallerstein (fn. 1), 649; OECD, Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study (OECD, 1995); and Peter Gottschalk and Timothy Smeeding, "Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature 35 (June 1997). For further specifications of the wage data used here, see OECD, "Earnings Inequality, Low-Paid Employment and Earnings Mobility," Employment Outlook (July 1996).
16. eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions," in Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskke, eds., Unions, Employers and Central Banks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The use of country dummies and the small number of Austrian observations (7) renders our analysis essentially unaffected by the exceptional nature of the Austrian wage data.
17. eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions," in Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskke, eds., Unions, Employers and Central Banks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The use of country dummies and the small number of Austrian observations (7) renders our analysis essentially unaffected by the exceptional nature of the Austrian wage data.
18. eds., Social Corporatism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); and Jonas Pontusson, "Wage Distribution and Labor Market Institutions," in Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskke, eds., Unions, Employers and Central Banks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). The use of country dummies and the small number of Austrian observations (7) renders our analysis essentially unaffected by the exceptional nature of the Austrian wage data.
19. The trend for wage inequality becomes more impressive if we look at the wage distribution among men and women separately. See OECD (fn. 4,1996); and Jonas Pontusson, David Rueda, and Christopher Way, "The Role of Political-Institutional Variables in the Making of Gendered Patterns of Wage Inequality" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1999).
20. The trend for wage inequality becomes more impressive if we look at the wage distribution among men and women separately. See OECD (fn. 4,1996); and Jonas Pontusson, David Rueda, and Christopher Way, "The Role of Political-Institutional Variables in the Making of Gendered Patterns of Wage Inequality" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1999).
21. The trend for wage inequality becomes more impressive if we look at the wage distribution among men and women separately. See OECD (fn. 4,1996); and Jonas Pontusson, David Rueda, and Christopher Way, "The Role of Political-Institutional Variables in the Making of Gendered Patterns of Wage Inequality" (Working paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, 1999). In most countries increases of within-gender inequality have been offset by continued compression of betweengender wage differentials.
22. Robert Topel, "Wage Inequality and Regional Labor Market Performance in the United States," in Toshiaki Tachibanaki, ed., Labour Market and Economic Performance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); and Lars Svensson, Closing the Gender Gap (Lund: Ekonomisk-Historiska Föreningen, 1995).
23. Robert Topel, "Wage Inequality and Regional Labor Market Performance in the United States," in Toshiaki Tachibanaki, ed., Labour Market and Economic Performance (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); and Lars Svensson, Closing the Gender Gap (Lund: Ekonomisk-Historiska Föreningen, 1995).
24. Adrian Wood, North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
25. Gottschalk and Smeeding (fn. 4); Rowthorn (fn. 5); Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, "International Difference in Male Wage Inequality," Journal of Political Economy 104 (August 1996); and various contributions to Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
26. Gottschalk and Smeeding (fn. 4); Rowthorn (fn. 5); Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, "International Difference in Male Wage Inequality," Journal of Political Economy 104 (August 1996); and various contributions to Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
27. Gottschalk and Smeeding (fn. 4); Rowthorn (fn. 5); Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, "International Difference in Male Wage Inequality," Journal of Political Economy 104 (August 1996); and various contributions to Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
28. Gottschalk and Smeeding (fn. 4); Rowthorn (fn. 5); Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, "International Difference in Male Wage Inequality," Journal of Political Economy 104 (August 1996); and various contributions to Richard Freeman and Lawrence Katz, eds., Differences and Changes in Wage Structures (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
29. Cf. James Galbraith, Created Unequal (New York: Free Press, 1998).
30. Richard Freeman, "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (October 1980); idem, "Union Wage Practices and Wage Dispersion within Establishments," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (October 1982); cf. also Blau and Kahn (fn. 9).
31. Richard Freeman, "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (October 1980); idem, "Union Wage Practices and Wage Dispersion within Establishments," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (October 1982); cf. also Blau and Kahn (fn. 9).
32. Richard Freeman, "Unionism and the Dispersion of Wages," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34 (October 1980); idem, "Union Wage Practices and Wage Dispersion within Establishments," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 (October 1982); cf. also Blau and Kahn (fn. 9).
33. Cf. Freeman (fn. 11,1980).
34. The Eurobarometer of June-July 1994 yields the following figures for average union density by income quartile in the EU member states: lowest quartile, 37.5 percent; second-to-lowest quartile, 37.8 percent; second-to-highesr quartile, 34.2 percent; and highest quartile, 23.7 percent. For all countries but Canada the union-density data used in our regressions refer to net rather than gross union density ("employed union members as a percentage of the employed labor force" rather than "union members as a percentage of the total labor force").
35. Wallerstein (fn. 1); Iversen (fn. 3), 2-5; Rowthorn (fn. 5); Blau and Kahn (fn. 9); and OECD, "Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining," Employment Outlook (July 1997).
36. Wallerstein (fn. 1); Iversen (fn. 3), 2-5; Rowthorn (fn. 5); Blau and Kahn (fn. 9); and OECD, "Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining," Employment Outlook (July 1997).
37. Wallerstein (fn. 1); Iversen (fn. 3), 2-5; Rowthorn (fn. 5); Blau and Kahn (fn. 9); and OECD, "Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining," Employment Outlook (July 1997).
38. Wallerstein (fn. 1); Iversen (fn. 3), 2-5; Rowthorn (fn. 5); Blau and Kahn (fn. 9); and OECD, "Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining," Employment Outlook (July 1997).
39. Wallerstein (fn. 1); Iversen (fn. 3), 2-5; Rowthorn (fn. 5); Blau and Kahn (fn. 9); and OECD, "Economic Performance and the Structure of Collective Bargaining," Employment Outlook (July 1997).
40. Wallerstein (fn. 1), 674.
41. Peter Swenson, Fair Shares (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), 56-58.
42. For a detailed specification, see Iversen (fn. 3), 83-86
43. To capture the inertia associated with institutional change, these yearly figures were lagged so that the value for a given year used in our regressions is the average for that year and the previous four years. It should also be noted that we have extrapolated centralization values for the last two years of our time series.
44. Lawrence Kahn, "Wage Inequality, Collective Bargaining and Relative Employment 1985-94" (Working paper, Institute for Labor Market Policies, Cornell University, 1999).
45. OECD, "Trends in Trade-Union Membership," Employment Outlook (July 1991), 113.
46. Focusing on wage restraint rather than wage distribution, Geoffrey Garrett and Christopher Way present similar arguments about the distinctive dynamics of public sector bargaining; see Garrett and Way, "Public Sector Unions, Corporatism and Wage Determination," in Iversen, Pontusson, and Soskice (fn. 5).
47. Drawing on microdata for the early 1990s from the Luxembourg Income Survey, Gornick and Jacobs report very sizable public sector wage premiums for men and women alike in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S., but not in Sweden. See Janet Gornick and Jerry Jacobs, Gender, the Welfare State and Public Employment, Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper no. 168 (1997).
48. Cf., e.g., Garrett (fn. 3).
49. Tom Cusack, "Partisan Politics and Public Finance," Public Choice 91, no. 3-4 (1997).
50. Katzenstein (fn. 2); and idem, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
51. Katzenstein (fn. 2); and idem, Policy and Politics in West Germany (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
52. E.g., Soskice (fn. 2, 1990 and 1999).
53. The coverage rates estimated by the OECD do not necessarily pertain to wage agreements. A government decision to extend a collective agreement on summer holidays could account tor France's exceptionally high coverage rate.
54. Peter Hall, "Organized Market Economies and Unemployment in Europe" (Manuscript, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1998).
55. As we explain in the conclusion, the question of how to code Japan and Switzerland turns out to be of no consequence for our main findings.
56. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "Nuisance vs. Substance," in John Freeman, ed., Political Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 6:1. The results of Breusch-Godfrey tests indicate that there is no significant autocorrelation in our regressions. In tests with a variety of lags, we could not reject the null hypothesis (nonexistence of autocorrelation) at a level even close to the 90 percent traditional significance threshold. See William Greene, Econometric Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 595.
57. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "Nuisance vs. Substance," in John Freeman, ed., Political Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 6:1. The results of Breusch-Godfrey tests indicate that there is no significant autocorrelation in our regressions. In tests with a variety of lags, we could not reject the null hypothesis (nonexistence of autocorrelation) at a level even close to the 90 percent traditional significance threshold. See William Greene, Econometric Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 595.
58. Cf. George Box and Gwilyn Jenkins, Time Series Analysis (Oakland, Calif.: Holden-Day, 1976), chap. 1.
59. See Cheng Hsiao, Analysis of Panel Data (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
60. For the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 the results of F-tests show that the country dummies are significant at better than the 99 percent level.
61. Stephen Nickell, "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica 49 (November 1981).
62. See T. W. Anderson and Cheng Hsiao, "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components," Journal of the American Statistical Association 76 (September 1981); and idem, "Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Econometrics 18 (January 1982). This is similar to the method suggested by Hibbs and employed by Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange. See Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Dynamic Time Series Models," in Herbert Costner, ed., Sociological Methodology 1973/1974 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974); and Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991).
63. See T. W. Anderson and Cheng Hsiao, "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components," Journal of the American Statistical Association 76 (September 1981); and idem, "Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Econometrics 18 (January 1982). This is similar to the method suggested by Hibbs and employed by Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange. See Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Dynamic Time Series Models," in Herbert Costner, ed., Sociological Methodology 1973/1974 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974); and Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991).
64. See T. W. Anderson and Cheng Hsiao, "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components," Journal of the American Statistical Association 76 (September 1981); and idem, "Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Econometrics 18 (January 1982). This is similar to the method suggested by Hibbs and employed by Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange. See Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Dynamic Time Series Models," in Herbert Costner, ed., Sociological Methodology 1973/1974 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974); and Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991).
65. See T. W. Anderson and Cheng Hsiao, "Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components," Journal of the American Statistical Association 76 (September 1981); and idem, "Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Econometrics 18 (January 1982). This is similar to the method suggested by Hibbs and employed by Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange. See Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Dynamic Time Series Models," in Herbert Costner, ed., Sociological Methodology 1973/1974 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974); and Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange, "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991).
66. 2 obtained in the first-stage IV regressions was higher than. 95.
67. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz propose a method for deriving consistent standard error estimates in the presence of panel-heteroscedastic errors that has been widely adopted by students of comparative political economy, e.g., Garrett (fn. 3); and Iversen (fn. 3); see Beck and Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section DMA" American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). When we ran our regressions with the Beck-Katz procedure (estimating panel-corrected standard errors without instrumental variables), we obtained results that were essentially the same as those reported below (available upon request). None of our substantive findings are affected by the choice of one or the other of these setups.
68. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz propose a method for deriving consistent standard error estimates in the presence of panel-heteroscedastic errors that has been widely adopted by students of comparative political economy, e.g., Garrett (fn. 3); and Iversen (fn. 3); see Beck and Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section DMA" American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). When we ran our regressions with the Beck-Katz procedure (estimating panel-corrected standard errors without instrumental variables), we obtained results that were essentially the same as those reported below (available upon request). None of our substantive findings are affected by the choice of one or the other of these setups.
69. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz propose a method for deriving consistent standard error estimates in the presence of panel-heteroscedastic errors that has been widely adopted by students of comparative political economy, e.g., Garrett (fn. 3); and Iversen (fn. 3); see Beck and Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section DMA" American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995). When we ran our regressions with the Beck-Katz procedure (estimating panel-corrected standard errors without instrumental variables), we obtained results that were essentially the same as those reported below (available upon request). None of our substantive findings are affected by the choice of one or the other of these setups.
70. In terms of overall numbers, the interpolations make up for the loss of observations entailed by the use of a lagged dependent variable. More importantly, interpolation enables us to include Norway in our analysis.
71. Wood (fn. 8). The more fine-grained analysis by Vincent Mahler, David Jesuit, and Douglas Roscoe also fails to establish any clear and consistent pattern of association between wage inequality and various dimensions of "globalization." See Mahler, Jesuit, and Roscoe, "Exploring the Impact of Trade and Investment on Income Inequality," Comparative Political Studies 32 (May 1999).
72. Wood (fn. 8). The more fine-grained analysis by Vincent Mahler, David Jesuit, and Douglas Roscoe also fails to establish any clear and consistent pattern of association between wage inequality and various dimensions of "globalization." See Mahler, Jesuit, and Roscoe, "Exploring the Impact of Trade and Investment on Income Inequality," Comparative Political Studies 32 (May 1999).
73. Garrett (fn. 3); Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996); John Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," in Kitschelt et al. (fn. 2); and Garrett (fn. 3).
74. Garrett (fn. 3); Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996); John Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," in Kitschelt et al. (fn. 2); and Garrett (fn. 3).
75. Garrett (fn. 3); Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996); John Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," in Kitschelt et al. (fn. 2); and Garrett (fn. 3).
76. Garrett (fn. 3); Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," World Politics 48 (January 1996); John Stephens, Evelyne Huber, and Leonard Ray, "The Welfare State in Hard Times," in Kitschelt et al. (fn. 2); and Garrett (fn. 3).