Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government

International Organization

Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 695-729

  Rodden, Jonathan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0348159957     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818303574021     Document Type: Review

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