Polarized platforms and moderate policies with checks and balances

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 75, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 1-20

  Alesina, Alberto ^a   Rosenthal, Howard ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Elections; Parties; Platform positions; Policies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040975107     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00048-1     Document Type: Article

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