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Volumn 67, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-19

The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation

Author keywords

Politico economic equilibrium; Progressive taxation

Indexed keywords


EID: 0002715447     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00001     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (120)

References (13)
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    • Candidate reputations and the 'Incumbency Effect'
    • BERNHARDT, M. D., AND D. INGBERMAN (1985): "Candidate Reputations and the 'Incumbency Effect'," Journal of Public Economics, 27, 47-67.
    • (1985) Journal of Public Economics , vol.27 , pp. 47-67
    • Bernhardt, M.D.1    Ingberman, D.2
  • 3
    • 84936034419 scopus 로고
    • Robustness of the multi-dimensional voting model: Candidates' motivations, uncertainty, and convergence
    • CALVERT, R. (1985): "Robustness of the Multi-Dimensional Voting Model: Candidates' Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence," American Journal of Political Science, 29, 69-95.
    • (1985) American Journal of Political Science , vol.29 , pp. 69-95
    • Calvert, R.1
  • 4
    • 0001970452 scopus 로고
    • A political theory of progressive income taxation
    • by A. Melzer, A. Cukierman, and S. F. Richard. New York: Oxford University Press
    • CUKIERMAN, A., AND A. MELTZER (1991): "A Political Theory of Progressive Income Taxation," in Political Economy, by A. Melzer, A. Cukierman, and S. F. Richard. New York: Oxford University Press.
    • (1991) Political Economy
    • Cukierman, A.1    Meltzer, A.2
  • 9
    • 85034549798 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in New Garb
    • in press forthcoming
    • ROEMER, J. E. (in press): "Why the Poor do not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb," forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.
    • Journal of Public Economics
    • Roemer, J.E.1
  • 10
    • 0031483391 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
    • _ (1997): "Political-Economic Equilibrium when Parties Represent Constituents: The Unidimensional Case," Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 479-502.
    • (1997) Social Choice and Welfare , vol.14 , pp. 479-502
  • 11
    • 0000827058 scopus 로고
    • Fairness, self-interest, and the politics of the progressive income tax
    • SNYDER, J., AND G. KRAMER (1988): "Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax," Journal of Public Economics, 36, 197-230.
    • (1988) Journal of Public Economics , vol.36 , pp. 197-230
    • Snyder, J.1    Kramer, G.2
  • 12
    • 84974191786 scopus 로고
    • Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternatives
    • WITTMAN, D. (1983): "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternatives," American Political Science Review, 77, 142-157.
    • (1983) American Political Science Review , vol.77 , pp. 142-157
    • Wittman, D.1
  • 13
    • 0003920368 scopus 로고
    • Princeton: Princeton University Press
    • YOUNG, P. (1994): Equity. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    • (1994) Equity
    • Young, P.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.