Downs and two-party convergence

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 7, Issue , 2004, Pages 25-46

  Grofman, Bernard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Divergence; Political competition; Political parties; Rational choice; Voter choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 3142719081     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104711     Document Type: Review

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