Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 465-488

  Palomino, Frédéric ^a,b   Vega Redondo, Fernando ^c  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b CEPR   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Aspirations; Bounded rationality; Cooperation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033481949     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050120     Document Type: Article

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