Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 117-146

  Rassenti, Stephen ^a   Reynolds, Stanley S ^a   Smith, Vernon L ^a   Szidarovszky, Ferenc ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b University of Arizona   (United States)

Author keywords

Cournot games; Experimental economics 026; Game theory 215; Industrial organization 610; Learning; Nash equilibrium; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010714610     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00090-6     Document Type: Article

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