Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 292-331

  Karandikar, Rajeeva ^a   Mookherjee, Dilip ^b   Ray, Debraj ^b,c   Vega Redondo, Fernando ^d  

^a INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE   (India)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Barcelona)   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000825694     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2379     Document Type: Article

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