Political power and economic policy: Theory, analysis, and empirical applications

Political Power and Economic Policy: Theory, Analysis, and Empirical Applications

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-519

  Rausser, Gordon C ^a   Swinnen, Johan ^b   Zusman, Pinhas ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924656696     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511978661     Document Type: Book

References (519)

1. Acemoglu, D. 2003. “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics.” Journal of Comparative Economics 31:620–652.
2. Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2000. “Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development.”American Economic Review 90:126–130.
3. Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2001a. “A Theory of Political Transitions.” American Economic Review 91:938–963.
4. Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2001b. “Inefficient Redistribution.” American Political Science Review 95:649–661.
5. Acemoglu, D.A. and J.A. Robinson, 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
6. Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson. 2008. “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions.” American Economic Review 98:267–293.
7. Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski. 2006. “Markets versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms.” NBERWorking Paper No. 12224.
8. Ackrill, R. 2000. The Common Agricultural Policy. Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield.
9. Adams, G., G. Rausser and L. Simon. 1996. “Modelling Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to California Water Policy.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 30:97–111.
10. Aghion, P., A. Alesina, and F. Trebbi. 2004. “Endogenous Political Institutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:565–611.
11. Aghion, P. and O.J. Blanchard. 1993. “On the Speed of Transition in Eastern Europe.” Unpublished, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
12. Ahmed, S. 1966. “On the Theory of Induced Innovation.” Economic Journal 76: 344–357.
13. Alston, J. and B.H. Hurd. 1990. “Some Neglected Social Costs of Government Spending in Farm Programs.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72:150–156.
14. Alston, J. and J.S. James. 2002. “The Incidence of Agricultural Policy.” In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume 2, Chapter 33, Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
15. Alston, J. and W. Martin. 1995. “Reversal of Fortune: Immiserizing Technical Change in Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77:225–259.
16. Alston, J. and P.G. Pardey. 1994. “Distortions in Prices and Agricultural Research Investments.” In Agricultural Technology: Policy Issues for the International Community, J.R. Anderson (ed.). CAB International, Wallingford, 59–84.
17. Alston, J.M. and P.G. Pardey. 1996. Making Science Pay: The Economics of Agricultural R& D Policy. American Enterprise Institute Press, Washington, DC.
18. Alston, J., G. Edwards, and J. Freebairn. 1988. “Market Distortions and Benefits from Research.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 70:281–288.
19. Alston, J., G.W. Norton, and P.B. Pardey. 1995. Science Under Scarcity: Principles and Practice for Agricultural Research Evaluation and Priority Setting. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
20. Alston, J., P.G. Pardey, and J. Roseboom. 1998. “Financing Agricultural Research: International Investment Patterns and Policy Perspectives.” World Development 26:1057–1071.
21. Alston, J.M, P.G. Pardey, J.S. James and M.A. Andersen. 2009. “A Review of Research on the Economics of Agricultural R&D.” In Annual Review of Resource Economics 1.
22. Alt, J.E. and K.A. Shepsle. 1990. Perspectives of Positive Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
23. Amacher, G.S., E. Koskela, E. and M. Ollikainen. 2004. “Environmental Quality Competition and Eco-labeling.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 47:284–306.
24. Amemiya, T. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
25. Amiti M, and J. Konings. 2007. “Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from Indonesia.” American Economic Review 97:1611–1638.
26. Anbar, D. and E. Kalai. 1978. “A One-Shot Bargaining Problem.” International Journal of Game Theory 7:13–18.
27. Anderson, J.R., P.G. Pardey, and J. Roseboom. 1994. “Sustaining Growth in Agriculture: A Quantitative Review of Agricultural Research Investments.” Agricultural Economics 10:107–123.
28. Anderson, K. 1995. “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 43:401–423.
29. Anderson, K. (ed.) Forthcoming. Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: A Global Perspective, 1955 to 2007. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
30. Anderson, K. and E. Valenzuela. 2007. “Do Global Trade Distortions Still Harm Developing County Farmers?” Review of World Economics 143:108–139.
31. Anderson, K. and Y. Hayami. 1986. The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection. Allen & Unwin Inc., Winchester.
32. Anderson, K., R. Damania, and L.A. Jackson. 2004. “Trade, Standards, and the Political Economy of Genetically Modified Food.” CEPR Discussion Papers 4526, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
33. Arndt, T.M., D.G. Dalrymple, and V.W. Ruttan. 1977. Resource Allocation and Productivity in National and International Agricultural Research. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
34. Arrow, Kenneth J. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values, 1st edition, Wiley, New York.
35. Aslund, A. 1991. “Principles of Privatization.” In Systematic Change and Stabilization in Eastern Europe, L. Csaba (ed.), Aldershot, Dartmouth, UK, 17–31.
36. Asscher, N. 1976. “An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games without Side Payments.” Mathematics of Operations Research 1:381–389.
37. Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz. 1980. Lectures on Public Economics. McGraw-Hill: New York.
38. Aumann, R.J. 1985. “An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value”. Econometrica 53:599–612.
39. Aumann, R.J. and M. Kurz. 1977. “Power and Taxes.” Econometrica 45:1137–1161.
40. Austen-Smith, D. 2000. “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation.” Journal of Political Economy 108:1235–1269.
41. Balaoing, A. and J. Francois. 2006. “The Political Economy of Protection in a Customs Union: What Drives the Tariff Structure of the EU?” Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Working Paper.
42. Baland, J.M. and A. Kotwal. 1998. “The Political Economy of Underinvestment in Agriculture.” Journal of Development Economics 55:233–247.
43. Baldwin, R. and F. Robert-Nicoud. 2007. “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers.”Journal of the European Economic Association 5:1064–1093.
44. Bale, M.D. and B.L. Greenshields. 1978. “Japanese agricultural distortions and their welfare value”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60:59–64.
45. Ball, R.J. 1995. “Interest Groups, Influence and Welfare.” Economics and Politics 7: 119–146.
46. Ball, V.E. 1985. “Output, Input, and Productivity Measurement in U.S. Agriculture, 1948–79.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67:475–486.
47. Bardhan, P. 1989. The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
48. Baron, D.P. and J.A. Ferejohn. 1987.“Bargaining andAgenda Formation in Legislatures.” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 14:117–173.
49. Baron, D.P. and J.A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83:1181–1206.
50. Barrett, S. 1994. “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade. Journal of Public Economics 54:325–338.
51. Barrett, C.B. and Y. Yang. 2001. “Rational Incompatibility with International Product Standards.” Journal of International Economics 54:171–191.
52. Basset, T. and D. Crummey. 1993. Land in African Agrarian Systems. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison.
53. Becker, G.S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:371–400.
54. Becker, G.S. 1985. “Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs.” Journal of Public Economics 28:329–347.
55. Becker, G. and C.B. Mulligan. 2003. “Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government.” Journal of Law and Economics 46:293–340.
56. Beghin, J.C. 1990. “A Game Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72:138–148.
57. Beghin, J.C and M. Kherallah. 1994. “Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 76:482–489.
58. Beghin, J.C, W.E. Foster and M. Kherallah. 1996. “Institutions and Market Distortions: International Evidence for Tobacco.” Journal of Agricultural Economics, 47:355–365.
59. Belloc, M. and P. Guerrieri. 2008. “Special Interest Groups and Trade Policy in the EU.” Open Econ Review 19:457–478.
60. Berg, A. and J. Sachs. 1992. “Structural Adjustment and International Trade in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland.” Economic Policy 14:117–173.
61. Bernheim, B.D, and M.D. Whinston. 1986. “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 101:1–31.
62. Besley, T. and M. Ghatak. 2007. “Retailing Public Goods: The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility.” Journal of Public Economics 91:1645–663.
63. Besley, T. and S. Coate. 1998. “Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis.” American Economic Review 88:139–156.
64. Besley, T. and S. Coate. 2001. “Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy.” Review of Economic Studies 68: 67–82.
65. Bhagwati, J.N. 1971. ‘The Generalized Theory of Trade and Welfare.’ In Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, J.N. Bhagwati, R.W. Jones, R.A. Mundell, J. Vanek (eds.). North Holland, Amsterdam.
66. Bhagwati, J.N. 1982. “Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking Activities: A Welfare Theoretic Synthesis and Generalization.” Journal of Political Economy 90:988–1002.
67. Bindseil, U. and C. Hantke. 1997. “The Power Distribution in Decision Making among EU Member States.” European Journal of Political Economy 13:171–185.
68. Binmore, K. 1987. “Nash Bargaining Theory II”. In The Economics of Bargaining, K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
69. Binmore, K. and P. Dasgupta. 1987.“Nash Bargaining Theory: An Introduction.” In The Economics of Bargaining, K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta (eds.). Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
70. Binmore, K.G., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. 1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling.” Rand Journal of Economics 17:176–188.
71. Binswanger, H., K. Deininger, and G. Feder. 1995. “Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations. In Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 3, C Hollis and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.). Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam: 2659–2672.
72. Binswanger, H., Y. Mundlak, M. Yang, and A. Bowers. 1985. “Estimation of Aggregate Agricultural Supply Response.” Unpublished manuscript, World Bank, Washington, DC.
73. Bishop, R.L. 1964. “A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining.” Econometrica 32: 410–417.
74. Black, D. 1948. “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making.” Journal of Political Economy 56:23–34.
75. Black, D. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
76. Blanchard, E. and G. Willmann. 2007. “Political Statis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reformin a Democracy.”Unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia.
77. Bockstael, N. 1984. “The Welfare Implications of Minimum Quality Standards.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66:466–71.
78. Bombardini, M. 2008. “Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation.” Journal of International Economics 75:329–348.
79. Bordes, G. and N. Tideman. 1991.“Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting.” Theory and Decision 30:163–186.
80. Bowles, S. and H. Gintis. 1993.“Power and Wealth in a Competitive Capitalist Economy”. Philosophy and Public Affairs 21:334–353.
81. Boyce, J. and R. Evenson. 1975. National and International Agricultural Research and Extension Programs. Agricultural Development Council, New York.
82. Brandow, G.E. 1961. “Interrelations Among Demands for Farm Products and Implications for Control of Market Supply.” Bulletin No. 680, Pennsylvania Agricultural Experiment Station, University Park, PA.
83. Bredahl, M., W.K. Bryant, and V.W. Ruttan. 1980. “Behavior and Productivity Implications of Institutional and Project Funding of Research.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62:371–383.
84. Brock, W.A. and S.P. Magee. 1979. “Tariff Formation in a Democracy.” In Current Issues in International Commercial Policy and Economic Diplomacy, J. Black and B. Hindley (eds.). MacMillan Press, London.
85. Browning, E.K. “The Marginal Cost of Public Funds.” Journal of Political Economy 84:283–298.
86. Buchanan, J.M. 1965. “An Economic Theory of Clubs.” Economica 32:1–13.
87. Buchanan, J.M. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
88. Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
89. Burton, D.M., H.A. Love, and G.C. Rausser. 2004. “Estimating Statistical Properties of Political Economic Decisions”, Applied Economics 36:1489–1499.
90. Buccola, S. and C. Sukume. 1993. “Social Welfare of Alternative Controlled-Price Policies.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 75:86–96.
91. Bullock, D.S. 1994a. “Are Government Transfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis.”A paper prepared for the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association (San Diego, CA), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
92. Bullock, D.S. 1994b. “In Search of Rational Government: What Political Preference Studies Measure and Assume.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76: 347–361.
93. Burt, O.R. and V.E. Worthington. 1988. “Wheat Acreage Supply Response in the United States.” Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 13:100–111.
94. Cadot, O., J. de Melo, and M. Olarreaga. 2004. “Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries.” World Bank Economic Review 18:345–366.
95. Carter, M.R. 1987.“Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Decollectivization of Agriculture.” Oxford Economic Papers 39:577–595.
96. Caselli, F. and M. Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 88: 759–782.
97. Castanheira, M. and R. Gerard. 2000. “The Optimal Speed of Transition: A General Equilibrium Analysis.” International Economic Review 41:219–239.
98. Chambers, R.G. and R.J. Just. 1979. “A Critique of Exchange Rate Treatment in Agricultural Trade Models.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61:249–257.
99. Chambers, R.G. and R.J. Just. 1981. “Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on U.S. Agriculture: A Dynamic Analysis.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63:32–46.
100. Chambers, R.G. and R. Lopez. 1993. “Public Investment and Real-Price Supports.” Journal of Public Economics 52:73–82.
101. Chavas, J.P. and R.M. Klemme. 1986. “Aggregate Milk Supply Response and Investment Behavior on U.S. Dairy Farms.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 678:55–66.
102. Che, J. 2009. “A Dynamic Model of Privatization with Endogenous Post-Privatization Performance.” Review of Economic Studies 76:563–596.
103. Cho, I. K. and D.M. Kreps. 1987. “Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:179–221.
104. Chow, G.C. 1981. Econometric Analysis by Control Methods, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
105. Coase, R.H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 16:386–405.
106. Coase, R.H. 1960. “The Problem of Social Cost.” Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1–44.
107. Coate, S. and S. Morris. 1995. “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests.” Journal of Political Economy 103:1210–1235.
108. Coate, S. and S. Morris. 1999. “Policy Persistence.” American Economic Review 89: 1327–1336.
109. Cochrane, W.W. 1979. The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis. The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
110. Coggins, J.S. 1995. “Rent Dissipation and the Social Cost of Price Policy.” Economics and Politics 7:147–166.
111. Coleman, W.D. and S. Tangermann. 1999. “The 1992 Reform, the Uruguay Round and the Commission: Conceptualizing Linked Policy Games.” Journal of Common Markets 37:385–405.
112. Cooper, R.N. and R. Layard. 2002. What the Future Holds: Insights from Social Science. MIT Press, Boston.
113. Cooper, R. and W. Ross. 1985. “Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard.” Rand Journal of Economics 16:103–113.
114. Corden, W.M. 1969. “Effective Protection Rates in the General Equilibrium Model.” Oxford Economic Papers 21:135–141.
115. Coricelli, F., F. Milesi, and M. Gian. 1993. “On the Credibility of Big Bang Programs: A Note on Wage Claims and Soft Budget Constraints in Economies in Transition.” Discussion Paper 124, Center for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
116. Cornes, R. and T. Sandler, 1996. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
117. Corson, W. and W. Nicholson. 1981. “Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers: Results of a Survey of Recipients under the Trade Act of 1974.” In Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 4, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 417–469.
118. Coyle, W.T. 1981. Japan’s Rice Policy, Foreign Agricultural Economics Report Number 164(July), Economics and Statistics Service, USDA.
119. Craeybeckx, J., 1973. “De agrarische depressie van het einde der XIXe eeuw en de politieke strijd om de boeren I.” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis 4: 190–230.
120. Crampes, C. and A. Hollander. 1995. “Duopoly and Quality Standards.” European Economic Review 39:71–82.
121. Cremer, J. and T.R. Palfrey. 2000. “Federal Mandates by Popular Demand.” Journal of Political Economy 108: 905–927.
122. Crombez, C. 1996. “Legislative Procedures in the European Community.” British Journal of Political Science 26:199–228.
123. Crombez, C. 1997. “The Codecision Procedure in the European Union.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22:97–119.
124. Crombez, C. 2000. “Institutional Reform and Codecision in the European Union.” Constitutional Political Economy 11:41–57.
125. Crombez, C., T. Groseclose, and K. Krehbiel. 2006. “Gatekeeping.” Journal of Politics 68:322–334.
126. Currie, J. and A. Harrison, 1997, “Sharing the Costs: The Impact of Trade Reform on Capital and Labor in Morocco.” Journal of Labor Economics 15:44–71.
127. Curtis, K.R., J. McCluskey, and T. Wahl. 2004. “Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Food Products in the Developing World.” AgBio Forum 7:69–74.
128. Curtis, K.R., J. McCluskey, and J. Swinnen. 2008. “Differences in Global Risk Perceptions of Biotechnology and the Political Economy of the Media.” International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 8:79–89.
129. Dahl, R.A. 1957. “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 2:201–215.
130. Dal Bo, E. and R. Di Tella. 2006. “Plato O Plomo: Bribes and Punishments in a Theory of Political Influence.” American Political Science Review 100: 41–55.
131. de Gorter, H. and D. Zilberman. 1990. “On the Political Economy of Public Good Inputs in Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72:131–137.
132. de Gorter, H. and J. Swinnen. 1994. “The Economic Polity of Farm Policy.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 45:312–26.
133. de Gorter, H. and J. Swinnen. 1998. “The Impact of Economic Development on Redistributive and Public Research Policies in Agriculture.” Review of Development Economics 2:41–60.
134. de Gorter, H. and J. Swinnen. 2002. “Political Economy of Agricultural Policies.” In The Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier Science: North Holland, Amsterdam, 2073–2123.
135. de Gorter, H. and Y. Tsur. 1991. “Explaining Price Policy Bias in Agriculture: The Calculus of Support-Maximizing Politicians.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73:1244–1254.
136. de Gorter, H., D.J. Nielson, and G.C. Rausser. 1992. “Productive and Predatory Public Policies.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74: 27–37.
137. de Gorter, H., D.J. Nielson, and G.C. Rausser. 1995. “The Determination of Technology and Commodity Policy in the U.S. Dairy Industry.” In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of Policy Reform, G.C. Rausser (ed.). Springer-Verlag, New York, 253–74.
138. de Gorter, H., J. Pokrivcak, and J. Swinnen. 1998. “The ‘Restaurant-Table’ Effect: Europe and the Common Agricultural Policy.” In World Agricultural Trade, T. Yildrim, A. Schmitz and W. H. Furtan (eds.), Westview Press, Boulder.
139. Deininger, K. and G. Feder. 2002. “Land Institutions and Land Markets.” In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland, 288–331.
140. de Janvry, A. 1981. The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
141. de Janvry, A. 1984.“TheRole of Land Reformin Economic Development.”In Agricultural Development in the Third World, C.K. Eicher and J.M. Statz (ed.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 263–274.
142. de Janvry, A., E. Sadoulet, and M. Fafchamps. 1989. “Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovation, and the State.” In The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions, P. Bardhan (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 356–382.
143. Dennis, R. 2000. Steps Toward Identifying Central Bank Policy Preferences. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA.
144. Dewan, T. and K.A. Shepsle. 2008a.“Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part I.” British Journal of Political Science 38:362–382.
145. Dewan, T. and K.A. Shepsle. 2008b. “Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II.” British Journal of Political Science 38:543–564.
146. Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland. 1995. “The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty.” American Economic Review 8:1207–1223.
147. Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole. 1999. “The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies.” Review of Economic Studies 66:199–217.
148. Dixit, A. 1980. “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence.” The Economic Journal 90:95–101.
149. Dixit, A.K. 1996. The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
150. Dixit, A.K. and J.B. Londregan. 1995. “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency.” American Political Science Review 89:856–866.
151. Dixit, A.K., G.E. Grossman, and E.L. Helpman. 1997. “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making.” Journal of Political Economy 105:752–769.
152. Domar, E.D. 1970. “The Causes of Slavery and Serfdom: A Hypothesis.” Journal of Economic History 30:18–32.
153. Dutt, P. and D. Mitra. 2005. “Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation.” Review of Economics and Statistics 87:59–72.
154. Downs, A. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York.
155. Eaton, J., and G.E. Grossman. 1985. “Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete.” Canadian Journal of Economics 18: 258–272.
156. Edwards, G.W. and J.W. Freebairn. 1984. “The Gains from Research into Tradable Commodities.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 66:41–49.
157. Ehrlich, S.D. 2007. “Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies.” International Organization 61:571–605.
158. Efron, B. 1979. “Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at the Jackknife.” Annals of Statistics 7:1–26.
159. Efron, B. 1987. “Better Bootstrap Confidence Intervals, with Discussion.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 82:181–185.
160. Efron, B. and G. Gong. 1983. “A Leisurely Look at the Bootstrap, the Jackknife, and Cross-Validation.” The American Statistician 37:36–48.
161. Efron, B. and R. Tibshirani. 1986. “Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, Confidence Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy.” Statistical Science 1:54–75.
162. Elbasha, E.H. and T.L. Riggs. 2003. “The Effects of Information on Producer and Consumer Incentives to Undertake Food Safety Efforts: A Theoretical Model and Policy Implications.” Agribusiness 19:29–42.
163. Elster, J. 1989. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
164. Emons, W. 1988. “Warranties, Moral Hazard, and the Lemons Problem.” Journal of Economic Theory 46:16–33.
165. Evenson, R.E. and W. Huffman. 1993. “The Effects of R&D on Farm Size, Specialization and Productivity.” In Industrial Policy for Agriculture in the Global Economy, S.R. Johnson and S.A. Martin (eds.). Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa.
166. Evenson, R.E. and W. Huffman. 2001. “Structural and Productivity Change in U.S. Agriculture.” Agricultural Economics 24:127–147.
167. European Commission. 2006. “Allocation of 2005 EU Expenditure by Member State.” DG-Budget. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/revenue_expenditure_en.htm
168. Fafchamps, M., E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry. 1993. “Tariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Framework.” Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 2:167–189.
169. Falck-Zepeda, J.B., G. Traxler and R.G. Nelson. 2000. “Surplus Distribution from the Introduction of a Biotechnology Innovation.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82:360–369.
170. Fearne, A. 1991. “The CAP Decision-Making Process.” In The Common Agricultural Policy and the World Economy, C. Ritson and D. Harvey (eds.). C.A.B International, Wallingford.
171. Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik. 1991. “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty.” American Economic Review 81: 1146–1155.
172. Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz. 1982. “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare.” In Import Competition and Response, J. Bhagwati (ed.). University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 223–243.
173. Fischer, R. and P. Serra. 2000. “Standards and Protection.” Journal of International Economics 52:377–400.
174. Fishel, W.D. 1971. Resource Allocation in Agricultural Research. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
175. Foster, W.E. and G.C. Rausser. 1993. “Price-distorting Compensation Serving the Consumer and Taxpayer Interest.” Public Choice, 77:275–291.
176. Fox, G. 1985. “Is the United States Really Underinvesting in Agricultural Research?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67:806–812.
177. Freedman, D.A. 1984. “On Bootstrapping Two-stage Least Squares Estimation in Stationary Linear Models.” The Annals of Statistics 12:827–842.
178. Freedman, D.A. and S.C. Peters. 1983. “Using the Bootstrap to Evaluate Forecasting Equations.” Technical Report, Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley.
179. Freedman, D.A. and S.C. Peters. 1984a. “Bootstrapping an Econometric Model: Some Empirical Results”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2:150–158.
180. Freedman, D.A. and S.C. Peters. 1984b. “Bootstrapping a Regression Equation: Some Empirical Results.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 79:97–106.
181. Froelich, N.J., A. Oppenheimer, and J. Young. 1971. Political Leadership and Collective Goods. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
182. Frye, T. and A. Shleifer. 1997. “The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand.” American Economics Review 87:354–358.
183. Fulton, M. and K. Giannakas. 2004. “Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The Market and Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86:42–60.
184. Fulton, M. and L. Karp. 1989. “Estimating the Objectives of Public Firm in a Natural Resource Industry.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 16: 268–287.
185. Furtan, W.H. 1983. “Economics of Crop and Oilseed Research in Canada.” Paper presented to the Outlook Conference, Ottawa, Canada.
186. Galbis, V. 1994. “Sequencing of Financial Sector Reforms: A Review.” Working Paper WP/94/101, International Monetary Fund, New York.
187. Gardner, B.L. 1983. “Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65:225–234.
188. Gardner, B.L. 1987a. The Economics of Agricultural Policies. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.
189. Gardner, B.L. 1987b. “Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs.” Journal of Political Economy 95:290–310.
190. Gardner, B.L. 1989. “Price Supports and Optimal Spending on Agricultural Research.” Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Working Paper, University of Maryland, April.
191. Gastil, R. 1987. Freedom in the World. Greenwood, Westport, CT.
192. Gates, S., P. Milgrom, and J. Roberts. 1993. “Complementarities in the Transition from Socialism: A Firm-Level Analysis.”Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.
193. Gawande, K. and P. Krishna. 2003. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches.” In Handbook of International Trade, E. K. Choi and J. Harrigan (eds.). Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 213–250.
194. Geertz, C. 1973. “Ideology as a Cultural System.” In The Interpretation of Cultures, C. Geertz (ed.), Basic Books, New York, Chapter 9.
195. Goldberg, P.K. and N. Pacvnic. 2003. “The Response of the Informal Sector to Trade Liberalization.” Journal of Development Economics 72:463–496.
196. Gray, J. 1989. “Hayek on the Market Economy and the Limits of State Action.” In The Economic Borders of the State, D. Helm (ed.). Oxford University Press, Oxford.
197. Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84: 833–850.
198. Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1995.“Trade Wars and Trade Talks” Journal of Political Economy 103:675–708.
199. Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
200. Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman. 2002. Interest Groups and Trade Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
201. Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman. 2005a. “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120:1239–1282.
202. Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman. 2005b. “Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics.” NBER Working Paper No. W11396.
203. Gutman, J.M. 1978. “InterestGroups and the Demand for Agricultural Research.” Journal of Political Economy 86:467–484.
204. Hadwiger, D.F. 1981. The Politics of Agricultural Research. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska.
205. Hall, B.H., C. Cummins, and R. Schnake. 1995. Time Series Processor Version 4.3, TSP International, Palo Alto, CA.
206. Hansen, L.P. 1982. “Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimation.” Econometrica 50:1029–1054.
207. Harberger, A.C. 1964. “The Measurement of Waste.” American Economic Review 74: 58–76.
208. Hardin, R. 1982. Collective Action. The John Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Baltimore, MD.
209. Hare, P., and T. Revesz. 1992. “Hungary’s Transition to a Market Economy: The Case Against a ‘Big-Bang.”’ Economic Policy 14:227–264.
210. Harsanyi, J.C. 1956. “Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games.” Econometrica 24:144–157.
211. Harsanyi, J.C. 1962a.“Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Cost, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Game.” Behavioral Science 7:67–80.
212. Harsanyi, J.C. 1962b. “Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations.” Behavioral Science 7:81–91.
213. Harsanyi, J.C. 1963. “A Simplified Bargaining Model for n-Person Cooperative Game.” International Economic Review 4:194–220.
214. Harsanyi, J.C. 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
215. Harvey, D. 1982. “National Interests and the CAP.” Food Policy 7:174–190.
216. Hausman, D.M. and M.S. McPherson. 1993. “Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.” Journal of Economic Literature 31:671–731.
217. Hayami, Y. and V.W. Ruttan. 1985. Agricultural Development: An International Perspective. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
218. Hayami, Y., A.R. Ma Quisumbing, and L.S. Adriano. 1990. Towards an Alternative Land Reform Paradigm. Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manilla.
219. Hayek, F.A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
220. Heckscher, E. 1949. “The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income.” In Readings in the Theory of International Trade, H.S. Ellis and L.A. Metzler (eds.). Blackston Press, Philadelphia.
221. Hellman, J.S. 1998. “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reforms in Postcommunist Transitions.” World Politics, 50:203–234.
222. Henning, C. 2004. “The Role of Institutions in Agricultural Protection.” In The Role of Institutions in Rural Policies and Agricultural Markets, G. Van Huylenbroeck, W. Verbeke, and L. Lauwers (eds.). Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam.
223. Henning, C. and U. Latacz-Lohmann. 2004. “Will Enlargement Gridlock CAP Reforms? A Political Economy Perspective.” Euro Choices 3:38–43.
224. Hertel, T.W. 1989. “Technology and Factor Mobility.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71:559–573.
225. Hertel, T.W., V.E. Ball, K.S. Huang, and M.E. Tsigas. 1989. “Farm Level Demand Elasticities for Agricultural Commodities.”Research Bulletin # 988, Agricultural Experiment Station, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
226. Hertford, R. and A. Schmitz. 1977. “Measuring Economic Returns to Agricultural Reserch.” In Resource Allocation and Productivity in National and International Agricultural Research, T.M. Arndt, D.G. Dalrymple, and V.W. Ruttan (eds.), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 148–167.
227. Hillman, A.L. 1982. “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives.” American Economic Review 72:1180–1187.
228. Hillman, A.L. 1989. The Political Economy of Protection. Harwood Academic Publishers, New York.
229. Hillman, A.L. and J.G. Riley. 1989. “Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers.” Economics and Politics 1:17–39.
230. Hirshleifer, J. 1991. “The Paradox of Power.” Economics and Politics 3:177–200.
231. Hopkins, R., A. Powell, A. Roy, and C.L. Gilbert. 2000. “The World Bank, Conditionality and the Comprehensive Development Framework.” In The World Bank: Structure and Policies, C.L. Gilbert, and D. Vines, (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 282–298.
232. Hosli, M. 1996. “Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34:255–273.
233. Huffman, W.E. and J.A. Miranowski. 1981. “An Economic Analysis of Research Expenditures on Agricultural Experiment Station Research.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63:104–118.
234. Huffman, W.E. and R.E. Evenson. 1992. “Contributions of Public and Private Science and Technology to U.S. Agricultural Productivity.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 74:751–756.
235. Huffman, W.E. and R.E. Evenson. 1994. “The Development of US Agricultural Research and Education: An Economic Perspective.” Iowa State University Department of Economics, Ames, IA.
236. Huffman, W.E. and R.E. Evenson. 2006. Science for Agriculture: A Long-Term Perspective. (2nd edition) Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
237. Institute of Farm Income Research. 1971. The Profitability of Dairy Farming and Cost of Fodder Crops in Israel in 1969–70. Institute of Farm Income Research Series D, No. 6, Tel Aviv, Israel.
238. Intriligator, M.D. 1971.Mathematical Optimization and Economic Theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
239. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. 1973. Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1972. Government of Israel, Jerusalem.
240. Jeanneret, M. and T. Verdier. 1996. “Standardization and Protection in a Vertical Differentiation Model.” European Journal of Political Economy 12:253–271.
241. Jessop, B. 1977. “Recent Theories of the Capitalist State.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 1:353–373.
242. Johnson, D.G. 1973.WorldAgriculture in Disarray. Macmillan St. Martin’s Press, London.
243. Johnson, D.G. 1991.World Agriculture in Disarray, 2nd edition. Macmillan, London.
244. Johnson, D.G. and K.M. Brooks (eds.). 1983. Prospects for Soviet Agriculture in the 1980s. Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
245. Jones, R.W. 1970. “Effective Protection and Substitution.” Journal of International Economics 1:59–82.
246. Jones, R.W. 1975. “Income Distribution and Effective Protection in a Multicommodity Trade Model.” Journal of Economic Theory 11:1–15.
247. Josling, T. and H.W. Moyer. 1991. “The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community: A Public Choice Interpretation.” In The Political Economy of International Organizations. A Public Choice Approach, R. Vaubel and T.D. Willet (eds.). Westview Press, Boulder.
248. Judd, K.L. 1987. “The Welfare Cost of Factor Taxation in a Perfect-Foresight Model.” Journal of Political Economy 95:675–709.
249. Judd, M.A., J.K. Boyce, and R.E. Evenson. 1983. “Investing in Agricultural Supply.” Discussion Paper No. 442, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven.
250. Just, R.E. 1981. Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve Program Needs Modi?cation to Improve Effectiveness: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations in Agricultural Buffer Stock Policy Under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. CED–81.70, Volume 3, June, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington.
251. Just, R.E. and G.C. Rausser. 1984. “Uncertain Economic Environments and Conditional Policies.” In Alternative Agricultural and Food Policies and the 1985 Farm Bill, G.C. Rausser and K. R. Farrell (eds.). Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
252. Just, R.E., D.L. Hueth, and A. Schmitz. 1982. Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
253. Just, R.E., D.L. Hueth, and A. Schmitz. 2008. Applied Welfare Economics. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.
254. Kalt, J.P. and M.R. Zupan. 1984. “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review 74:279–300.
255. Karp, L. and J. Perloff. 2002.“A Synthesis of Agricultural Trade Economics.”InHandbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam, Chapter 37.
256. Katranidis, S. and A. Vakrou. 2002. “Member States Positions and Voting Coalitions on the Agenda 2000 CAP Reform.” Cahiers d’Economie and Sociologie Rurales 63:5–30.
257. Kau, J.B. and P. Rubin. 1979. “Self Interest, Ideology and Log-Rolling.” Journal of Law and Economics 22:365–384.
258. Keefer, P. and S. Khemani. 2005.“Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services.” World Bank Research Observer 20:1–27.
259. Khanna, J., W.E. Huffman and T. Sandler. 1994. “Agricultural Research Expenditures in the United States: A Public Goods Perspective.” Review of Economics and Statistics 76:267–277.
260. Kirschke, D. 1983. “Maximizing Welfare in Customs Unions: The Case of Agricultural Price Policy within the EEC.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65: 791–795.
261. Kletzer, L.G. 2004. “Trade-Related Job Loss and Wage Insurance: A Synthetic Review.” Review of International Economics 12:724–748.
262. Koester, U. 1977. “The Redistributional Effects of the Common Agricultural Financial System.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 4:321–345.
263. Koisch, Y. and J. Zukerman. 1968. Survey of the Dairy Processing Sector. Israel Institute of Labor Productivity, Tel Aviv, Israel.
264. Konings, J. and H. Vandenbussche. 2005. “Antidumping Protection and Markups of Domestic Firms: Evidence from Firm Level Data.” Journal of International Economics 65:151–165.
265. Konings, J. and H. Vandenbussche. 2008. “Heterogeneous Responses to Trade Protection.” Journal of International Economics 76:371–383.
266. Kornai, J. 1990. The Road to a Free Economy, Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary. W.W. Norton and Company, New York.
267. Kornblut, A.E. and M.D. Shear. 2007 “’Architect’ Envisioned GOP Supremacy.” Washington Post, August 14, Page A1.
268. Krishna, V. and R. Serrano. 1995. “Multilateral Bargaining.” Review of Economic Studies 63:61–80.
269. Krueger, A.O. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64:291–303.
270. Krueger, A.O. 1993. “Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development.” American Economic Review 83:351–355.
271. Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff, and A. Valdes. 1988. “Agricultural Incentives in Developing Countries.” World Bank Economic Review 2:255–272.
272. Kruse, D.L. 1988. “International Trade and the Labor Market Experience of Displaced Workers.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41:402–417.
273. Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole. 1991. “The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:1089–1127.
274. Lakatos, I. 1970. “Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” In Criticism and Growth of Knowledge, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
275. Lapan, H.E. and G. Moschini. 2007. “Grading, Minimum Quality Standards, and the Labeling of Genetically Modified Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89:769–783.
276. Laver, M. and K.A. Shepsle. 1990. “Coalitions and Cabinet Governments.” American Political Science Review 84:873–890.
277. Lee, D.R. and G. Rausser. 1992. “The Structure of Research and Transfer Policies in International Agriculture.” In Issues in Agricultural Development, Sustainability and Cooperation, Margot Bellamy and Bruce Greenshields (eds.). International Association of Agricultural Economists Occasional Paper 6:34–42.
278. Lee, D.R. and P.G. Helmberger. 1985. “Estimating Supply Response in the Presence of Farm Programs.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 676:191–203.
279. Lee, H.Y. 1991. From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
280. Leland, H.E. 1979. “Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards.” Journal of Political Economy 87:1328–1346.
281. Li, D.D. 1998. “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy.” American Economic Review 88:393–397.
282. Lichtenberg, E. and D. Zilberman. 1986. “The Welfare Economics of Price Supports in U.S. Agriculture.” American Economic Review 76:1135–4111.
283. Lin, J.Y. 1992. “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China.” American Economic Review 82:34–51.
284. Lindner, R.K. and F.G. Jarrett. 1978. “Supply Shifts and the Size of Research Benefits.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69:48–58.
285. Lipsey, R.G. and K. Lancaster. 1957. “The General Theory of ‘Second Best’.” Review of Economic Studies 24:11–32.
286. Lipton, D. and J. Sachs. 1990. “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 75–147.
287. Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2001. “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives.” The American Economic Review 91:225–239.
288. Lizzeri, A. and N. Persico. 2004.“Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119:707–765.
289. Lockwood, B. 2002. “Distributive Politics and the Cost of Centralization.” Review of Economic Studies 69:313–337.
290. Love, H.A. and E. Muriningtyas. 1992.“Measuring the Degree of Market Power Exerted by Government Trade Agencies.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74: 546–555.
291. Love, H.A., G.C. Rausser, and D.M. Burton. 1990. “Policy Preference Functions: Grand Themes and New Directions.” Working Paper No. 571, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
292. Love, H.A., G.C. Rausser, and J. Freebairn. 1974. “The Effectiveness of Government Policy in Controlling Agricultural Output.” Paper presented at the American Economic Association Meeting, Cornell University.
293. Lyons, R.F., G.C. Rausser, and L.K. Simon. 1994.“Disruption and Continuity in Bulgaria’s Agrarian Reform.” In Privatization of Agriculture in New Market Economies: Lessons from Bulgaria, A. Buckwell, S. Davidova, K. Mounton, and A. Schmitz (eds.). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA.
294. Luce, D.R. and H. Raiffa. 1957. Games and Decisio Coricelli ns. Wiley, New York.
295. Lueck, T. J. 1989. “The Bulk-for-Benefits Deal in Zoning.” New York Times, July 12, sec. 10, p. 1.
296. Maclennan, A. 1982. “A General Noncooperative Theory of Bargaining.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto.
297. Macours, K. and J. Swinnen. 2002. “Patterns of Agrarian Transition.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 50:365–394.
298. Madison, J. 1898. Federalist Paper No. 10. In The Federalist and Other Constitutional Papers, E.H. Scott (ed.). Scott, Forsman, Chicago.
299. Maertens, M. and J. Swinnen. 2009. “Trade, Standards and Poverty: Evidence from Senegal.” World Development 37:161–178.
300. Maertens, M. and J. Swinnen. 2010. “Standards, Trade and Developing Countries.” In Trade Adjustment Costs in Developing Countries: Impact, Determinants and Policy Responses, Porto, G. and B.M. Hoekman (eds.). World Bank Publications, Washington, DC.
301. Magee, C. 2001.“Administered Protection for Workers: Analysis of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program.” Journal of International Economics 53:105–125.
302. Magee, S.P, W.A. Brock and L. Young. 1989. Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
303. Mahé, L.M. and T.L. Roe. 1996. “The Political Economy of Reforming the 1992 CAP Reform.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:1314–1323.
304. Marette, S. and J.C. Beghin. 2010. “Are Standards Always Protectionist?” Review of International Economics 18:179–92.
305. Mayer, W. 1984. “Endogenous Tariff Formation.” American Economic Review 74: 970–985.
306. Mayer, W. and R. Riezman. 1987. Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments. Journal of International Economics 23:337–381.
307. Mayer, W., and R. Riezman. 1989. “Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model.” Economics and Politics 1:61–79.
308. McCubbins, M.D., R.G. Noll, and B.R. Weingast. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75:431–482.
309. McMillan, J. 2002. Reinventing the Bazaar. The Natural History of Markets. W.W. Norton & Company, New York.
310. McMillan J. and B. Naughton. 1992. “How to Reforma Planned Economy: Lessons from China.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 8:130–143.
311. McMillan, J., G.C. Rausser, and S.R. Johnson. 1993. “Freedoms and Economic Growth: Transitional and Permanent Components.” WP 93-WP 115, CARD, Iowa State University.
312. Meade, J.E. 1955. Trade and Welfare. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
313. Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Public Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:609–657.
314. Mishan, E.J. 1976. Cost-Bene??t Analysis. Prager Publishers, New York.
315. Mitchell, D.J.B. 1989. Human Resource Management: An Economic Approach. PWS-Kent Publishing Co., Boston.
316. Mitra, D. 1999.“Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-run Model of Trade Policy Determination.” American Economic Review 89:1116–1134.
317. Moe, T.M. 1980. The Organization of Interests. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
318. Moravcsik, A. 1994. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach.” In Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context, S. Bulmer and A. Scott (eds.). Blackwell, Oxford.
319. Moschini, G., L. Menapace, and D. Pick. 2008. “Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90:794–812.
320. Moulin, H. 1982. “Bargaining and Noncooperative Implementation.” Unpublished manuscript, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris.
321. Moyer, H.W. and T.E. Josling. 1990. Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the EC and the USA. Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York.
322. Mueller, D.C. 2003. Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, New York.
323. Mundlak, Y. 1978. “On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data.” Econometrica 46:69–85.
324. Murphy, J.A., W.H. Furtan, and A. Schmitz. 1993.“The Gains from Agricultural Research under Distorted Trade.” Journal of Public Economics, 51:161–172.
325. Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1992. “The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107:8989–906.
326. Murrell, P. 1993. “What is Shock Therapy? What Did it Do in Poland and Russia?” Post-Soviet Affairs 9:111–140.
327. Mussa, M. 1982. “Imperfect Factor Mobility and the Distribution of Income.” Journal of International Economics 12:125–141.
328. Mussa, M. and S. Rosen. 1978. “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic Theory 18:301–317.
329. Nagel, J.H. 1968. “Some Questions About the Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science 13:129–137.
330. Nash, J.F. 1950. “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 18:155–162.
331. Nash, J.F. 1951. “Non-cooperative Games.” Annals of Mathematics 54:286–295.
332. Nash, J.F. 1953. “Two-Person Cooperative Games.” Econometrica 21:128–140.
333. Neville-Rolfe, E. 1984. The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community. European Centre for Policy Studies, London.
334. Newbery, D. 1993. “Transformation in Mature Versus Emerging Economies: Why Has Hungary Been Less Successful than China?” China Economic Review 4:89–116.
335. Nitzan, S. and J. Paroush. 1985. Collective Decision Making: An Economic Outlook. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
336. North, D.C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. W.W. Norton and Co, New York.
337. North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, New York.
338. North, D.C. 1991.“Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires.”In The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, James D. Tracy (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
339. Nugent, N. 2003. The Government and Politics of the European Union. Palgrave, Basingstoke.
340. Núñez-Ferrer, J. 2001. “The Council of the EU and the Common Agricultural Policy.” PhD Thesis, University of London.
341. Nyberg, A. and S. Rozelle. 1999. Accelerating Development in Rural China. World Bank Monograph Series, Rural Development Division. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
342. Nykamp, P. and W.H. Somermeyer. 1971. “Explicating Implicit Social Preference Functions.” Economics of Planning 11:101–119.
343. O’Conner, J. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. St. Martin’s Press, New York.
344. Oehmke, J.F. 1988. “The Calculation of Returns to Research in Distorted Markets.” Agricultural Economics 2:291–302.
345. Olper, A. 1998.“Political Economy Determinants of Agricultural Protection in EU Member States: An Empirical Investigation.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 24:463–487.
346. Olper, A. 2007. “Land Inequality, Government Ideology, and Agricultural Protection.” Food Policy 32:67–83.
347. Olper, A. and J. Swinnen. 2009. “MassMedia e Politiche Agroalimentari: Alcune Recenti Evidenze Empiriche.” Agriregionieuropa 19.
348. Olson, M., Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
349. Olson, M., Jr. 1982. The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. Yale University Press, New Haven.
350. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1987. National Policies and Agricultural Trade, Country Study Japan. OECD.
351. O’Rourke, K.H. and A.M. Taylor. 2006.“Democracy and Protectionism.” NBER Working Paper No. 12250.
352. Ostrom, E. 1986. “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.” Public Choice 48:3–25.
353. Otsuka, K., H. Chuma, and Y. Hayami. 1992. “Land and Labor Contracts in Agrarian Economies: Theories and Facts.” Journal of Economic Literature 30:1965–2018.
354. Pappi, F.U. and C. Henning. 1999. “The Organization of Influence on the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy: A Network Approach.” European Journal of Political Research 36:257–281.
355. Pardey, P.G. and B. Craig. 1989.“CausalRelationships between Public Sector Agricultural Research Expenditures and Output.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71: 9–19.
356. Pardey, P.G. and J. Roseboom. 1989. ISNAR Agricultural Research Indicator Series: A Global Data Base on National Agricultural Research Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
357. Pardey, P.G., M.S. Kang, and H. Elliott. 1989. “Structure of Public Support for National Agricultural Research: A Political Economy Perspective.” Agricultural Economics 3:261–278.
358. Paul, G.S. and T. Verdier. 1997. “Power, Distributive Conflicts and Multiple Growth Paths.” Journal of Economic Growth 2:155–168.
359. Pearce, J. 1983. “The Common Agricultural Policy: The Accumulation of Special Interests.” In Policy Making in the European Union, H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. Webb (eds.).Wiley, Chichester.
360. Pell, J. and I. Van Staveren, (eds.). 2009. Handbook of Economics and Ethics. Edward Elgar, Northampton, MA.
361. Peltzman, S. 1976. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and Economics 19:211–240.
362. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
363. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
364. Persson, T., G. Roland, and G. Tabellini. 2000.“Comparative Politics and Public Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 108:1121–1161.
365. Peters, H. and P. Wakker. 1991. “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences.” Econometrica 59:1787–1801.
366. Peters, S.C. and D.A. Freedman. 1984. “Some Notes on the Bootstrap in Regression Problems.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2: 406–409.
367. Pirzio-Biroli, J. 2008. “An Inside Perspective on the Fischler Reforms.” In The Perfect Storm: The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, J. Swinnen (ed.). Centre for European Policy Studies Publications, Brussels.
368. Platteau, J.P. 2000. Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development. Harwood Academic, Amsterdam.
369. Pokrivcak, J. 1997. “The Politics of Price Determination in the EU’s CAP and the “Restaurant Table” Effect: Implications for East European Accession.” M.S. Thesis, Department of Agricultural, Resource and Managerial Economics, Cornell University.
370. Pokrivcak, J., H. de Gorter, and J. Swinnen. 2001. “Does a “Restaurant Table Effect” Exist with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy?: A Note.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 52:28–30.
371. Prendergast, C. 2007. “The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats.” American Economic Review 97:180–196.
372. Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:51–69.
373. Putterman, L. 1993. Continuity and Change in China’s Rural Development. Oxford University Press, New York.
374. Qian, Y. and C. Xu. 1993. “Why China’s Economic Reforms Differ: The M-form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State Sector.” Economics of Transition 1:135–170.
375. Qian, Y., G. Roland, and C. Xu. 1999. “Why is China Different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from Organization Theory.” European Economic Review 43:1085–1094.
376. Rausser, G.C. 1982. “Political Economic Markets: PERTs and PESTs in Food and Agriculture.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64:821–833.
377. Rausser, G.C. 1992. “Predatory Versus Productive Governments: The Case of U.S. Agricultural Policy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 6:133–157.
378. Rausser, G.C. 1995. GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of Policy Reform. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
379. Rausser, G.C. and E. Hochman. 1979.DynamicAgricultural Systems: Economic Prediction and Control. Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
380. Rausser, G.C. and G. Roland. 2010. “Special Interests Versus the Public Interest: The Determination of Policy Instruments.” In Political Economy of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, K. Anderson (ed.), World Bank, Washington, DC.
381. Rausser, G.C. and H. de Gorter. 1990. “Endogenizing Policy in Models of Agricultural Markets.” In Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent World, A. Maunder (ed.). Gower, Aldershot.
382. Rausser, G.C. and J.W. Freebairn. 1974. “Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics 56: 437–449.
383. Rausser, G.C. and L.K. Simon. 1992a. “The Political Economy of Alliances: Structure and Performance.” Working Paper No. 665, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
384. Rausser, G.C. and L.K. Simon. 1992b. “The Political Economy of Transition in Eastern Europe: Packaging Enterprises for Privatization.” In The Emergence of Market Economies, C. Clague and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
385. Rausser, G.C. and L.K. Simon. 1999. “A Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach.” Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Working Paper No. 620, University of California, Berkeley.
386. Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. 1991. “Organizational Failure and the Political Economy of Water Resource Management.” In The Economics and Management of Water and Drainage in Agriculture, A. Dinar and D. Zilberman, (eds.). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 735–758.
387. Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. 1992. “Public Policy: Explanation and Constitutional Prescription.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74:247–257.
388. Rausser, G.C. and R.E. Goodhue. 2002. “Public Policy: Its Many Analytical Dimensions”. in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam, Chapter 39.
389. Rausser, G.C. and R. Stevens. 2009. “Public-Private Partnerships: Goods and the Structure of Contracts.” Annual Review of Resource Economics 1, forthcoming.
390. Rausser, G.C. and W.E. Foster. 1990. “Political Preference Functions and Public Policy Reform.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72:642–652.
391. Rausser, G.C., E. Litchtenberg, and R. Lattimore. 1982. “Developments in Theory and Empirical Applications of Endogenous Governmental Behavior.” In New Directions in Econometric Modeling and Forecasting in U.S. Agriculture, G.C. Rausser (ed.). New York: Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., New York, 547–614.
392. Rausser, G.C., J.A. Chalfant, H.A. Love, and K.G. Stamoulis. 1986. “Macroeconomic Linkages, Taxes, and Subsidies in the U.S. Agricultural Sector.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68:399–412.
393. Rausser, G. C., L.K. Simon, and K. van’t Veld. 1994. “Political Economic Processes and Collective Decision Making.” Working Paper No. 718, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
394. Rawls, J. 1973. “Distributive Justice.” In Economic Justice, E.S. Phelps (ed.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England, 319–362.
395. Ray, P. 1973. “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.” Econometrica 41:987–991.
396. Rayner, R.K. 1990. “Bootstrapping ρ Values and Power in the First-order Autoregression: A Monte Carlo Investigation.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 8:251–263.
397. Richardson, J.D. 1982. “Trade-Adjustment Assistance under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.” In Import Competition and Adjustment: Theory and Policy, J.N. Bhagwati (ed.). University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
398. Riethmuller, P. and T.L. Roe. 1998. “Government Intervention in Commodity Markets: The Case of Japanese Rice and Wheat Policy.” Journal of Policy Modeling 8:327–349.
399. Riker, W.H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press, New Haven.
400. Rimland, D. 1968. Economic Analysis of the Israeli Dairy Market and the Milk Marketing Board. M.Sc. thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
401. Robinson, J.A. and T. Verdier. 2003. “The Political Economy of Clientelism.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3205.
402. Rodrik, D. 1995. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy.” In Handbook of International Economics, Volume 3, G. Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds.). North-Holland, Amsterdam.
403. Roe, B. and I. Sheldon. 2007. “Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89:1020–1033.
404. Roelfsema, H. 2004. “Political Institutions and Trade Protection.” TC Koopmans Research Institute, Discussion Paper Series 04–06.
405. Roemer, J.E. 1978.“Neoclassicism, Marxism, and Collective Action.” Journal of Economic Issues 12:147–161.
406. Roland, G. 1991. “Political Economy of Sequencing Tactics in the Transition Period.” In Systematic Change and Stabilization in Eastern Europe, L. Casab (ed.). Aldershot, Dartmouth, UK, 47–64.
407. Roland, G. 1994. “The Role of Political Constraints in Transition Strategies.” Economics of Transition 2:27–41.
408. Roland, G. 2000. Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms. MIT Press, Cambridge.
409. Ronnen, U. 1981. “Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition.” RAND Journal of Economics 22:490–504.
410. Rose-Ackerman, S. and R.E. Evenson. 1985. “The Political Economy of Agricultural Research and Extension: Grants, Votes, and Reapportionment.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 67:1–14.
411. Rozelle, S. 1996. “Gradual Reform and Institutional Development: The Keys to Success of China’s Rural Reforms.” In Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions, J. McMillan and B. Naughton (eds.).University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 197–220.
412. Rozelle, S. and J. Swinnen. 2004. “Success and Failure of Reforms: Insights from Transition Agriculture.” Journal of Economic Literature 42:404–456.
413. Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 50: 97–109.
414. Runge, C.F. and H. vonWitzke. 1987.“Institutional Change in the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69:213–222.
415. Russell, B. 1938. Power: A Social Analysis. Allen and Unwin, London.
416. Ruttan, V.W. 1982. Agricultural Research Policy. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
417. Ruttan, V.W. 1983. “Agricultural Research Policy Issues.” Horticultural Science 108: 809–818.
418. Sachs, J. and W.T. Woo. 1994. “Structural Factors in the Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union.” Economic Policy 9:101–145.
419. Sadoulet, E., R. Murgai, and A. de Janvry. 2001. “Access to Land via Land Rental Markets.” In Access to Land, Rural Poverty, and Public Action, A. de Janvry, G. Gordillo, J.-P. Platteau, and E. Sadoulet (eds.). Oxford University Press, New York, 197–227.
420. Salemi, M.K. 1995. “Revealed Preference of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse-control Theory to Interpret the Policy Equation of a Vector Autoregression.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 13:419–433.
421. Salter, W.E.G. 1960. Productivity and Technological Change, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
422. Schleich, T. 1999. “Environmental Quality with Endogenous Domestic and Trade Policies.” European Journal of Political Economy 15:53–71.
423. Schmitz, A. and D. Seckler. 1970.“Mechanized Agriculture and Social Welfare: The Case of the Tomato Harvester.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 52:569–577.
424. Schultz, T.W. 1953. The Economic Organization of Agriculture. McGraw Hill, New York.
425. Scully, G. 1988. “The Institutional Framework and Economic Development.” Journal of Political Economics 96:652–662.
426. Sen, A.K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden-Day, San Francisco.
427. Sen, A.K. 1986. “Social Choice Theory.” In Handbook of Mathematical Economics, K.J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator (eds.). North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1073–1181.
428. Shleifer, A. 1997. “Government in Transition.” European Economic Review 41: 385–410.
429. Simon, H. 1956.“Dynamic Programming under Uncertainty with a Quadratic Criterion Function.” Econometrica 24:74–81.
430. Spence, M. 1976. “Product Differentiation and Welfare.” American Economic Review 66:407–414.
431. Stahl, I. 1972. Bargaining Theory. Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden.
432. Stahl, I. 1977. “An n-Person Bargaining Game in the Extensive Form.” In Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, R. Henn and O. Moeschlin (eds.). Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
433. Staiger, R.W. and G. Tabellini. 1987. “Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection.” American Economic Review 77:823–837.
434. Steiner, Peter O. 1969. “The Public Sector and the Public Interest.” In The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, Vol 1. Joint Economic Committee Print, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 13–46.
435. Steunenberg, B. 1994. “Decision Making Under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150:642–669.
436. Stigler, G.J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2:3–21.
437. Stopler, W.F. and P.A. Samuelson. 1941.“Protection and Real Wages.”Review of Economic Studies 9:58–73.
438. Straffin, P.D. 1988. “The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Power Indices as Probabilities.” In The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, A. E. Roth (ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
439. Sturm, D.M. 2006. “Product Standards, Trade Disputes, and Protectionism.” Canadian Journal of Economics 39:564–581.
440. Sugden, Robert. 1986. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.
441. Summers, R. and A. Heston. 1991. “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comresearchsons, 1950–1988.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:327–368.
442. Sumner, D.A. and S. Tangermann. 2002. “International Trade Policy and Negotiations.” In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
443. Sunding, D. and D. Zilberman. 2001.“TheAgricultural Innovation Process: Research and Technology Adoption in a Changing Agricultural Sector.” In Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1, B. Gardner and G.C. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam.
444. Sutton, J. 1986. “Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction.” Review of Economic Studies 53:709–724.
445. Swinnen, J. 1994a. “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76:1–14.
446. Swinnen, J. 1994b. “Political Economy of Policy Reform in Bulgarian Agriculture.” In Privatization of Agriculture in New Market Economies: Lessons from Bulgaria, A. Buckwell, S. Davidova, K. Moulton, and A. Schmitz (eds.). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA.
447. Swinnen, J. 1997.“Does Compensation for Disruptions Stimulate Reforms ? The Case of Agricultural Reform in Central Europe.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 24:249–266.
448. Swinnen, J. (ed.). 1997. The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Ashgate: Aldershot.
449. Swinnen, J. 1999.“The Political Economy of Land Reform Choices in Central and Eastern Europe.” The Economics of Transition 7:637–664.
450. Swinnen, J. 2001. “Will Enlargement Cause a Flood of Eastern Food Imports, Bankrupt the EU Budget, and Create WTO Conflicts?” Euro Choices 1:48–53.
451. Swinnen, J. 2002a. “Transition and Integration in Europe: Implications for Agricultural and Food Markets, Policy and Trade Agreements.” The World Economy 25:481–501.
452. Swinnen, J. 2002b. Political Reforms, Rural Crises, and Land Tenure in Western Europe. Food Policy 27:371–394.
453. Swinnen, J. 2008a. The Political Economy of the Agricultural Policy Distortions in Europe in the 19th and 20th Century, paper prepared for the World Bank.
454. Swinnen, J. (ed.) 2008b. “The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy.” Center for European Policy Studies.
455. Swinnen, J. and H. de Gorter. 1993. “Why Small Groups and Low Income Sectors Obtain Subsidies: The ‘Altruistic’ Side of a ‘Self-Interested’ Government.” Economics and Politics 4:285–293.
456. Swinnen, J. and H. de Gorter. 1998. “Endogenous Commodity and the Social Benefits from Public Research Expenditures.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80:107–115.
457. Swinnen, J. and H. de Gorter. 2002. “On Government Credibility, Compensation, and Under-Investment in Public Research.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 29:501–522.
458. Swinnen, J. and S. Rozelle. 2006. From Marx and Mao to the Market: The Economics and Politics of Agricultural Transition. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
459. Swinnen, J. and T. Vandemoortele. 2009. “Are Food Safety Standards Different from Other Food Standards? A Political Economy Perspective.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 36:507–523.
460. Swinnen, J., H. de Gorter and A. Banerjee. 2001. “Agricultural Protection and Economic Development: An Econometric Study of the Determinants of Agricultural Protection in Belgium since the 19th Century.”Agricultural Economics 26:25–43.
461. Swinnen, J., H. de Gorter, G. Rausser, and A. Banerjee. 2000. “The Political Economy of Public Research Investment and Commodity Policies in Agriculture: An Empirical Study.” Agricultural Economics 22:111–122.
462. Swinnen, J.F.M. and T. Vandemoortele. 2010. “On Butterflies and Frankenstein: A Dynamic Theory of Regulation.” Unpublished Manuscript. University of Leuven: LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economics.
463. Thies, C.G. and S. Porche. 2007. “The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection.” Journal of Politics 69:116–127.
464. Tian, H. 2003. “Eco-Labelling Scheme, Environmental Protection, and Protectionism.” Canadian Journal of Economics 36:608–633.
465. Tinbergen, J. 1954. Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
466. Tinbergen, J. 1956. Economic Policy: Principles and Design. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
467. Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
468. Tirole, J. 1990.“Privatization and Eastern Europe: Incentives and the Economics of Transition.” Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
469. Tollison, R.D. 1982. “Rent Seeking: A Survey.” Kyklos 35:575–602.
470. Tracy, M. 1984. “Issues of Agricultural Policy in a Historical Framework.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 35:307–318.
471. Tracy, M. 1996. Agricultural Policy in the European Union and Other Market Economies. APS-Agricultural Policy Studies, Brussels.
472. Tsebelis, G. 1994. “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter.” American Political Science Review 88:128–142.
473. Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett. 1996. “Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices, and Decision Making in the European Union.” International Review of Law and Economics 16: 345–361.
474. Tyers, R. and K. Anderson. 1992. Distortions in World Food Markets. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, for the Trade Policy Research Center.
475. Tullock, G. 1967. “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” The Western Economic Journal 5:224–232.
476. Tweeten, L.G. 1967. “The Demand for U.S. Farm Output.”Food Research Institute Studies 7:343–369.
477. Tweeten, L.G. 1979. Foundations of Farm Policy. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln.
478. U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1986. Food Security Act of 1985: Major Provisions Affecting Commodities. Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 497, January. Economic Research Service, Washington, DC.
479. U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1988. “Estimates of Producer and Consumer Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture, ” Economic Research Service, ATAD Staff Report No. AGES 880127.
480. U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 1995. Agricultural Research and Development: Public and Private Investments Under Alternative Markets and Institutions Economic Research Service, Natural Resources and Environment Division, Staff Paper Number AGES–9517.
481. Valletti, T.M. 2000.“Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 18:235–245.
482. Varian, H.R. 1992. Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd edition. Norton and Co., New York.
483. Viner, J. 1950. The Customs Unions Issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York.
484. von Cramon-Taubadel, S. 1992. “A Critical Assessment of the Political Preference Function.” Agricultural Economics 7:371–394.
485. Vranken, L. and J. Swinnen. 2006. “Land Rental Markets in Transition: Theory and Evidence from Hungary.”World Development 34:481–500.
486. Wädekin, K-E. 1990. “Determinants and Trends of Reformin Communist Agriculture: a Concluding Essay.” In Communist Agriculture: Farming in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, K-E Wädekin (ed.). Routledge, New York, 321–339.
487. Wallace, H. 1983.“Negotiation, Conflict, and Compromise: The Elusive Pursuit of Common Policies.” In Policy Making in the European Union, H. Wallace, W. Wallace, and C. Webb (eds.).Wiley, Chichester.
488. Webb, A.M., M. Lopez and R. Penn (eds.). 1990. “Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: Government Intervention in Agriculture: 1982–97.” Statistical Bulletin No. 803, ERS USDA, Washington DC.
489. Wegren, S.K. (ed.). 1998. Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Routledge, London.
490. Wei, S.J. 1993. “Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms.” Working Paper R93–2. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
491. Weingast, B.R. and D. Wittman, (eds.). 2006. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
492. Weingast, B.R., K.A. Shepsle, and C. Johnsen. 1981. “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics.”General Political Economy 89:642–664.
493. Widgren, M. 1994. “Voting Power in the EC Decision Making and the Consequences of Two Different Enlargements.” European Economic Review 38:1153–1170.
494. Williamson, O.E. 1975.Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. The Free Press, New York.
495. Williamson, O.E. 1979. “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22:233–260.
496. Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.
497. Williamson, O.E. 1993. “Opportunism and its Critics, ” Managerial and Decision Economics 14:97–107.
498. Willig, R.D. 1976. “Consumer’s Surplus Without Apology.” American Economic Review 66:589–597.
499. Wilson, J.Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Basic Books, New York.
500. Winkler, G.M. 1998. “Coalition-Sensitive Voting Power in the Council: The Case of Eastern Enlargement.” Journal of Common Market Studies 36:391–404.
501. Winters, L.A., N. McCulloch, and A. McKay. 2004. “Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence So Far.” Journal of Economic Literature 42:72–115.
502. Wohlgenant, M.K. 1989. “Demand for Farm Output in a Complete System of Demand Functions.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1:241–252.
503. Wong, C.P.W. (ed.) 1997. Financing Local Government in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University Press (for Asian Development Bank), Hong Kong.
504. Woo, W.T. 1994. “The Art of Reforming Centrally Planned Economies: Comparing China, Poland, and Russia.” Journal of Comparative Economics 18:276–308.
505. World Bank. 1986.World Development Report 1986. Oxford University Press, New York, for the World Bank.
506. World Bank. 2007.World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. The World Bank, Washington, DC.
507. Wright, B.D. 1985. An Assessment of the United States Farmer-Owned Reserve and Commodity Credit Corporation Storage as Market Stabilization Policies. American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.
508. Yang, D. 1996. Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA.
509. Zellner, A. and H. Theil. 1962. “Three Stage Least Squares: Simultaneous Estimation of Simultaneous Equations.” Econometrica 30:54–78.
510. Zerbe, R.O., (ed.). 2007. Research in Law and Economics: A Journal of Policy. Volume 23. Elsevier, New York.
511. Zeuthen, F. 1930. Problem of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. Routledge & Kagan, London.
512. Zusman, P. 1976. “The Incorporation and Measurement of Social Power in Economic Models.” International Economic Review 17:447–462.
513. Zusman, P. 1988. Individual Behavior and Social Choice in a Cooperative Settlement. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Magnes Press, Jerusalem.
514. Zusman, P. 1992. “Constitutional Selection of Collective Choice Rules in a Cooperative Enterprise.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 17:353–362.
515. Zusman, P. 1993. “Participants’ Ethical Attitudes and Organizational Structure and Performance: Application to the Cooperative Enterprise.” In Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition, C. Csaki and Yoav Kislev (eds.). West-View Press, San Francisco, 23–54.
516. Zusman, P. and A. Amiad. 1977. “A Quantitative Investigation of a Political Economy—The Israeli Dairy Program.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 59: 88–98.
517. Zusman, P. and C. Bell. 1989. “The Equilibrium Vector of Pairwise-Bargained Agency Contracts with Diverse Actors and Principals Owning a Fixed Resource.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11:91–114.
518. Zusman, P. and G.C. Rausser. 1990.“EquilibriumStates and Dynamic Behavior of a Political Economy: Application to Water Resource Management.”Working Paper No. 531, 514 References Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
519. Zusman, P. and G.C. Rausser. 1994. “Intraorganizational Influence Relations and the Optimality of Collective Action.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 24:1–17.