Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 329-348

  Bombardini, Matilde ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

D7; F13; H42; L7

Indexed keywords

FIRM SIZE; INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE; MODELING; POLITICAL PARTICIPATION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 44749090075     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.003     Document Type: Article

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