Access to protection: Domestic institutions and trade policy in democracies

International Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 571-605

  Ehrlich, Sean D ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34547541242     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818307070191     Document Type: Article

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