The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches

Handbook of International Trade

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 212-250

  Gawande, Kishore ^a   Krishna, Pravin ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Determinants of trade policy; Political economy influences; Political support; Tariff rate; Trade laws

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952621873     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470756461.ch8     Document Type: Chapter

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