On government credibility, compensation and under-investment in public research

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 501-522

  Swinnen, Johan F M ^a   De Gorter, Harry ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic political economy model; Endogenous policies; Public research investment; Time inconsistency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036963653     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/eurrag/29.4.501     Document Type: Article

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