Fluency and belief bias in deductive reasoning: New indices for old effects

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue JUN, 2014, Pages

  Trippas, Ies ^a   Handley, Simon J ^a   Verde, Michael F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief bias; Individual differences; Memory; Reasoning; Signal detection theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904574530     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00631     Document Type: Article

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