Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb

International Security

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 54-84

  Sagan, Scott D ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0005673781     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539273     Document Type: Article

References (161)

1. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
2. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
3. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
4. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
5. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
6. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
7. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
8. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
9. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
10. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
11. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
12. Among policymakers, John Deutsch presents the most unadorned summary of the basic argument that "the fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved." John M. Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41 (Fall 1992), pp. 124-125. Also see George Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2093 (December 1984), pp. 17-21. For examples of the dominant paradigm among scholars, see Michael M. May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," American Scientist, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 526-537; Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463-519; Benjamin Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," and Richard K. Betts, "Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited," both in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle, special issue of Security Studies, Vol. 2, No, 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 37-38 and pp. 100-124; and David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, amd Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 39. See Steve Fetter, "Verifying Nuclear Disarmament," Occasional Paper No. 29, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., October 1996, p. 38; and "Affiliations and Nuclear Activities of 172 NPT Parties," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), pp. 33-36. For earlier pioneering efforts to assess nuclear weapons latent capability and demand, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982).
13. For example, May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand"; Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime"; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation."
14. For example, May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand"; Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime"; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation."
15. For example, May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand"; Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Nonproliferation Regime"; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation."
16. The seminal text of neorealism remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-52; and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
17. The seminal text of neorealism remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-52; and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
18. The seminal text of neorealism remains Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979). Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 39-52; and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
19. The Israeli, and possibly the Pakistani, nuclear weapons decisions might be the best examples of defensive responses to conventional security threats; Iraq, and possibly North Korea, might be the best examples of the offensive coercive threat motivation. On the status quo bias in neorealist theory in general, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107, and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
20. The Israeli, and possibly the Pakistani, nuclear weapons decisions might be the best examples of defensive responses to conventional security threats; Iraq, and possibly North Korea, might be the best examples of the offensive coercive threat motivation. On the status quo bias in neorealist theory in general, see Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107, and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
21. Shultz, "Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," p. 18.
22. On the genesis of the atomic programs in World War II, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988) pp. 3-53; and Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
23. On the genesis of the atomic programs in World War II, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988) pp. 3-53; and Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
24. A. Lavrent'yeva in "Stroiteli novogo mira," V mire knig, No. 9 (1970), in David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 20, also quoted in Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 487.
25. A. Lavrent'yeva in "Stroiteli novogo mira," V mire knig, No. 9 (1970), in David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 20, also quoted in Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 487.
26. A. Lavrent'yeva in "Stroiteli novogo mira," V mire knig, No. 9 (1970), in David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 20, also quoted in Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 487.
27. Important sources on the British case include Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 3945-1952, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). On the French case, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
28. Important sources on the British case include Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 3945-1952, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). On the French case, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
29. Important sources on the British case include Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 3945-1952, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). On the French case, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
30. Important sources on the British case include Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 3945-1952, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). On the French case, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
31. Important sources on the British case include Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 3945-1952, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). On the French case, see Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965) and Wilfred L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
32. Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers During the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992), p. 494. The seminal source on the Chinese weapons program, which emphasizes the importance of U.S. nuclear threats in the 1950s, is John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).
33. Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers During the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992), p. 494. The seminal source on the Chinese weapons program, which emphasizes the importance of U.S. nuclear threats in the 1950s, is John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).
34. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
35. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
36. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
37. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
38. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
39. Recent estimates of the number of weapons India could deploy on short notice range from 25 to 105. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 185; Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 89; and Eric Arnett, "Implications of the Comprehensive Test Ban," in Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons after the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 13. Important sources on the Indian nuclear program include Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (New York: Praeger, 1976); Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 43-72; and T. T. Poulose, ed., Perspectives of India's Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978).
40. Valuable sources on Pakistan's program include Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991) and Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).
41. Valuable sources on Pakistan's program include Ziba Moshaver, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991) and Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm, 1987).
42. F. W. de Klerk, March 24, 1993 address to the South African parliament as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-TND-93-009, (March 29, 1993), p. 1 (henceforth cited as de Klerk, "Address to Parliament.") For analyses that focus largely on security threats as the cause of the program, see Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; and J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 98-109. For a more detailed and more balanced perspective see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 7-44.
43. F. W. de Klerk, March 24, 1993 address to the South African parliament as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-TND-93-009, (March 29, 1993), p. 1 (henceforth cited as de Klerk, "Address to Parliament.") For analyses that focus largely on security threats as the cause of the program, see Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; and J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 98-109. For a more detailed and more balanced perspective see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 7-44.
44. F. W. de Klerk, March 24, 1993 address to the South African parliament as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-TND-93-009, (March 29, 1993), p. 1 (henceforth cited as de Klerk, "Address to Parliament.") For analyses that focus largely on security threats as the cause of the program, see Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; and J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 98-109. For a more detailed and more balanced perspective see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 7-44.
45. F. W. de Klerk, March 24, 1993 address to the South African parliament as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-TND-93-009, (March 29, 1993), p. 1 (henceforth cited as de Klerk, "Address to Parliament.") For analyses that focus largely on security threats as the cause of the program, see Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; and J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 98-109. For a more detailed and more balanced perspective see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 7-44.
46. F. W. de Klerk, March 24, 1993 address to the South African parliament as transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), JPRS-TND-93-009, (March 29, 1993), p. 1 (henceforth cited as de Klerk, "Address to Parliament.") For analyses that focus largely on security threats as the cause of the program, see Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearization and Denuclearization in South Africa," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; and J.W. de Villers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 98-109. For a more detailed and more balanced perspective see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 7-44.
47. Military planners nonetheless developed nuclear target lists in their contingency military plans and research was conducted on development of the hydrogen bomb until 1985. See Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 16.
48. See de Klerk, "Address to Parliament," p. 2.
49. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
50. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
51. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
52. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
53. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
54. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 497; and May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," pp. 534-535. For analyses of the Argentine-Brazilian decision, see Monica Serrano, "Brazil and Argentina," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds. Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), pp. 231-255; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, "Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 10-14; Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 45-88; and John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 107-122.
55. Sherman Garnett writes, for example, that "for many Ukrainian citizens - not just the ethnic Russians - it is difficult to conceive of Russia as an enemy to be deterred with nuclear weapons." Sherman W. Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 8. Garnett also maintains that "the role that security assurances played in the creation of a framework for Ukrainian denuclearization is obvious. They were of immense importance." Sherman W. Garnett, "The Role of Security Assurances in Ukrainian Denuclearization," in Virginia Foran, ed., Missed Opportunities?: The Role of Security Assurances in Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, forthcoming 1997).
56. Sherman Garnett writes, for example, that "for many Ukrainian citizens - not just the ethnic Russians - it is difficult to conceive of Russia as an enemy to be deterred with nuclear weapons." Sherman W. Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 8. Garnett also maintains that "the role that security assurances played in the creation of a framework for Ukrainian denuclearization is obvious. They were of immense importance." Sherman W. Garnett, "The Role of Security Assurances in Ukrainian Denuclearization," in Virginia Foran, ed., Missed Opportunities?: The Role of Security Assurances in Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, forthcoming 1997).
57. See Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," p. 535; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow," pp. 47-54.
58. See Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," p. 535; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow," pp. 47-54.
59. See Lewis Dunn, Controlling the Bomb (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); May, "Nuclear Weapons Supply and Demand," p. 535; and Frankel, "The Brooding Shadow," pp. 47-54.
60. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79;
61. and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
62. This is a serious weakness shared by many domestic-level theories in international relations, not just theories of proliferation. On this issue, see Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751-774.
63. The best examples of this literature include Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). For a valuable effort to apply insights from the literature on social construction of technology to proliferation problems, see Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294.
64. The best examples of this literature include Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). For a valuable effort to apply insights from the literature on social construction of technology to proliferation problems, see Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294.
65. The best examples of this literature include Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). For a valuable effort to apply insights from the literature on social construction of technology to proliferation problems, see Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294.
66. The best examples of this literature include Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990). For a valuable effort to apply insights from the literature on social construction of technology to proliferation problems, see Steven Flank, "Exploding the Black Box: The Historical Sociology of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 259-294.
67. In 1963, U.S. intelligence agencies estimated that India could test a nuclear weapon in four to five years (1967 or 1968). By 1965, U.S. estimates were that it would take one to three years additional years. See Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation," in Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 202; and George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 68.
68. In 1963, U.S. intelligence agencies estimated that India could test a nuclear weapon in four to five years (1967 or 1968). By 1965, U.S. estimates were that it would take one to three years additional years. See Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation," in Davis and Frankel, The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 202; and George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the Russians (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 68.
69. See A.G. Noorani, "India's Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee," Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1967), pp. 490-502.
70. Frank E. Couper, "Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of Atomic Weapons," Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 192-193. Also see Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation," p. 201.
71. Frank E. Couper, "Indian Party Conflict on the Issue of Atomic Weapons," Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 192-193. Also see Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Proliferation," p. 201.
72. See Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 120-122. The director of the PNE study later wrote that "getting the Prime Minister to agree to this venture must have required great persuasion, as Shastriji was opposed to the idea of atomic explosions of any kind." Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), p. 74.
73. See Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), pp. 120-122. The director of the PNE study later wrote that "getting the Prime Minister to agree to this venture must have required great persuasion, as Shastriji was opposed to the idea of atomic explosions of any kind." Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), p. 74.
74. See Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 195; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 221 and p. 325 (note 42); and Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 75.
75. See Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 195; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 221 and p. 325 (note 42); and Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 75.
76. See Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 195; Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 221 and p. 325 (note 42); and Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 75.
77. Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 89.
78. See George Perkovich, "Indian Nuclear Decision-Making and the 1974 PNE," unpublished manuscript, W. Alton Jones Foundation, Charlottesville, Va., 1996, p. 15; and Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 89.
79. See George Perkovich, "Indian Nuclear Decision-Making and the 1974 PNE," unpublished manuscript, W. Alton Jones Foundation, Charlottesville, Va., 1996, p. 15; and Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 89.
80. See Neil H.A. Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security in India and Pakistan, unpublished dissertation, UCLA, 1986, p. 229; and Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 198. One former Indian Defense Secretary, K.B. Lall, has stated that the chairman of the chiefs of staff, the defense minister, and the defense secretary were not involved in the planning and argued therefore that "[the test] did not arise out of the Defense Ministry or on security grounds" since "if it was a defense project, there should have been some discussion." Lall interview quoted in Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security, p. 229.
81. See Neil H.A. Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security in India and Pakistan, unpublished dissertation, UCLA, 1986, p. 229; and Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 198. One former Indian Defense Secretary, K.B. Lall, has stated that the chairman of the chiefs of staff, the defense minister, and the defense secretary were not involved in the planning and argued therefore that "[the test] did not arise out of the Defense Ministry or on security grounds" since "if it was a defense project, there should have been some discussion." Lall interview quoted in Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security, p. 229.
82. See Neil H.A. Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security in India and Pakistan, unpublished dissertation, UCLA, 1986, p. 229; and Kapur, India's Nuclear Option, p. 198. One former Indian Defense Secretary, K.B. Lall, has stated that the chairman of the chiefs of staff, the defense minister, and the defense secretary were not involved in the planning and argued therefore that "[the test] did not arise out of the Defense Ministry or on security grounds" since "if it was a defense project, there should have been some discussion." Lall interview quoted in Joeck, Nuclear Proliferation and National Security, p. 229.
83. Although Gandhi denied, in a later interview, that domestic concerns influenced her 1974 decision, she did acknowledge that the nuclear test "would have been useful for elections." See Rodney W. Jones, "India," in Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: the Why and the Wherefore (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 114.
84. The Institute's analysis was that the increase was the result of both "the demonstration of India's atomic capability and the decisive action on the Railway strike," though the data outlined above suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the weapons test. See "The Prime Minister's Popularity: June 1974," and "Indian Public Opinion and the Railway Strike," in Monthly Public Opinion Surveys (Indian Institute of Public Opinion), Vol. 19, No. 8 (May 1974), pp. 5-6 and pp. 7-11;
85. and "Public Opinion on India's Nuclear Device," Monthly Public Opinion Surveys, Vol. 19, No. 9 (June 1974), Blue Supplement, pp. III-IV.
86. For a detailed analysis, see Itty Abraham's Atomic Energy and the Making of the Indian State, unpublished manuscript, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1996; and Itty Abraham, "India's 'Strategic Enclave': Civilian Scientists and Military Technologies," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 231-252.
87. For a detailed analysis, see Itty Abraham's Atomic Energy and the Making of the Indian State, unpublished manuscript, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 1996; and Itty Abraham, "India's 'Strategic Enclave': Civilian Scientists and Military Technologies," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 231-252.
88. See the chronology in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 8 and p. 27; and Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 4. Also see David Fischer, "South Africa," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 208; and David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 1994), pp. 6-8.
89. See the chronology in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 8 and p. 27; and Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 4. Also see David Fischer, "South Africa," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 208; and David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 1994), pp. 6-8.
90. See the chronology in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 8 and p. 27; and Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 4. Also see David Fischer, "South Africa," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 208; and David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 1994), pp. 6-8.
91. See the chronology in Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 8 and p. 27; and Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 10 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 4. Also see David Fischer, "South Africa," in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 208; and David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, May 1994), pp. 6-8.
92. See Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4.
93. See Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-6; and Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 4.
94. See Reiss, Bridled Ambitions, p. 12.
95. Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," p. 10.
96. A rare public hint that concerns about domestic stability played a role in the decision is the acknowledgment by the head of the Atomic Energy Corporation that the government discussed issuing an immediate announcement revealing the existence of the weapons and thus permitting the IAEA to dismantle them because "the state of the country's internal political transformation was not considered conducive to such an announcement at the time." See Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 7.
97. The best analysis is Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169.
98. Etel Solingen, The Domestic Sources of Nuclear Postures, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper No. 8, October 1994, p. 11.
99. On these costs and risks, see Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs Versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1994); Stephen I. Schwartz, "Four Trillion and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November/December 1995); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
100. On these costs and risks, see Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs Versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1994); Stephen I. Schwartz, "Four Trillion and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November/December 1995); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
101. On these costs and risks, see Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs Versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1994); Stephen I. Schwartz, "Four Trillion and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November/December 1995); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
102. On these costs and risks, see Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Weapons of Mass Destruction: Costs Versus Benefits (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1994); Stephen I. Schwartz, "Four Trillion and Counting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 6 (November/December 1995); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).
103. On nuclear ethics, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986); and Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a recent analysis of legal restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, see Nicholas Rostow, "The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 151-185. For a rare analysis of the symbolism of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, "The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics," in Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174-225.
104. On nuclear ethics, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986); and Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a recent analysis of legal restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, see Nicholas Rostow, "The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 151-185. For a rare analysis of the symbolism of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, "The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics," in Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174-225.
105. On nuclear ethics, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986); and Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a recent analysis of legal restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, see Nicholas Rostow, "The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 151-185. For a rare analysis of the symbolism of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, "The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics," in Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174-225.
106. On nuclear ethics, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Nuclear Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1986); and Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a recent analysis of legal restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, see Nicholas Rostow, "The World Health Organization, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear Weapons," Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 151-185. For a rare analysis of the symbolism of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, "The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics," in Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 174-225.
107. Among the most important sources are the essays collected in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).
108. Among the most important sources are the essays collected in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).
109. See Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 137-161; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565-598; Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 150-172. For an excellent survey and critique, see Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 325-348.
110. See Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 137-161; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565-598; Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 150-172. For an excellent survey and critique, see Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 325-348.
111. See Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 137-161; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565-598; Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 150-172. For an excellent survey and critique, see Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 325-348.
112. See Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 137-161; Martha Finnemore, "International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: UNESCO and Science Policy," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 565-598; Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1987), pp. 150-172. For an excellent survey and critique, see Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 325-348.
113. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
114. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
115. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
116. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
117. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
118. For rare applications of the norms perspective to proliferation, see Harald Müller, "The Internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 361-390; and Müller, "Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status," in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 301-339. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111-138; Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an International Norm," in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), pp. 37-61; Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn 1990), pp. 479-526; and Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 73-104.
119. Ethan Nadelman, who stresses this point about power, also adds, however, that "even among the laggards, indeed especially among the laggards, the consciousness of being perceived as primitive and deviant surely weighed heavily in the decisions of local rulers to do away with slavery." Nadelman, "Global Prohibition Regimes," p. 497.
120. See Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo"; and Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 144-216.
121. See Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo"; and Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 144-216.
122. For an excellent analysis of how such a process can work in other contexts, see Michael Byers, "Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 109-180.
123. David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and Doctrine," Adelphi Paper No. 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], Winter 1984/85), p. 4. Also see Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 36.
124. David S. Yost, "France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, Part I: Capabilities and Doctrine," Adelphi Paper No. 194 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], Winter 1984/85), p. 4. Also see Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 36.
125. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 421, as quoted in Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 489.
126. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 421, as quoted in Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," p. 489.
127. See Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex (La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1982), p. 131; and Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 120-122.
128. See Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex (La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1982), p. 131; and Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 120-122.
129. Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 171-173.
130. The British acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1952 predated the Soviet development of a secure second-strike capability.
131. The document is quoted in Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, p. 126.
132. For detailed analyses of the French nuclear weapons decision which focus attention on political prestige as the central source of policy, see Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic; and Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy. Also see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 472-487, 499-503.
133. For detailed analyses of the French nuclear weapons decision which focus attention on political prestige as the central source of policy, see Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic; and Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy. Also see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 472-487, 499-503.
134. For detailed analyses of the French nuclear weapons decision which focus attention on political prestige as the central source of policy, see Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic; and Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy. Also see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 472-487, 499-503.
135. Michel L. Martin, Warriors to Managers: The French Military Establishment Since 1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 21.
136. See Philip H. Gordon, "Charles de Gaulle and the Nuclear Revolution," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 129-130.
137. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 150, quoted in Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 502.
138. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 150, quoted in Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 502.
139. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 209 (emphasis in the original), quoted in Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, pp. 13-14.
140. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 209 (emphasis in the original), quoted in Yost, France's Deterrent Posture and Security in Europe, pp. 13-14.
141. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 44-45.
142. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66; and Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 44-45.
143. See William C. Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine," Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 22, April 1995, p. 49.
144. For a detailed analysis see Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms," RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 8 (February 19, 1993), pp. 21-45.
145. Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation," p. 19.
146. See Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes," pp. 21-22.
147. Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation," pp. 21-23; and Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes."
148. Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation," pp. 21-23; and Nahaylo, "The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes."
149. See Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation," p. 44; and Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," p. 12.
150. See Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation," p. 44; and Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," p. 12.
151. An excellent analysis of U.S. policy appears in Garnett, "Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT," pp. 10-12.
152. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. in New Pledge on Atom Test Ban," New York Times, January 31, 1995, p. 1; Dunbar Lockwood, "U.S. Drops CTB 'Early Out' Plan; Test Moratorium May Be Permanent," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), p. 27.
153. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. in New Pledge on Atom Test Ban," New York Times, January 31, 1995, p. 1; Dunbar Lockwood, "U.S. Drops CTB 'Early Out' Plan; Test Moratorium May Be Permanent," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March 1995), p. 27.
154. On this issue, see Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, "Phase Out the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 79-95; and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapons States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 6 (July/August 1994), pp. 3-9.
155. On this issue, see Barry M. Blechman and Cathleen S. Fisher, "Phase Out the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No. 97 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 79-95; and Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky and George Bunn, "The Doctrine of the Nuclear-Weapons States and the Future of Non-Proliferation," Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No. 6 (July/August 1994), pp. 3-9.
156. For contrasting views on this policy, see George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use Pledges?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, No. 4 (May/June 1996), pp. 7-10; and Gompert, Watman, and Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited."
157. For contrasting views on this policy, see George Bunn, "Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating its Non-Use Pledges?" Arms Control Today, Vol. 26, No. 4 (May/June 1996), pp. 7-10; and Gompert, Watman, and Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited."
158. For useful discussions, see Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995);
159. and Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis Jr., "How Do International Institutions Matter?: The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 451-478.
160. For important efforts to rethink the elimination issue, see "An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture," Report of the Steering Committee of the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., December 1995; and Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995), pp. 44-100.
161. For important efforts to rethink the elimination issue, see "An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture," Report of the Steering Committee of the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., December 1995; and Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (July 1995), pp. 44-100.