Reputations and deterrence: A theoretical and empirical assessment

Security Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 72-99

  Huth, Paul K ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0003000429     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429334     Document Type: Article

References (118)

1. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
2. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
3. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
4. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
5. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
6. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
7. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
8. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
9. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
10. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
11. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
12. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
13. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
14. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
15. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
16. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
17. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
18. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
19. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
20. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960);
21. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
22. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
23. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
24. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
25. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
26. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
27. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
28. Some of the founding works, and recent extensions, include Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Bruce R. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (June 1963): 97-109; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1975); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Frank C. Zagare, The Dynamics of Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence "Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Barry Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-35; John David Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles (London: Macmillan, 1992); Paul K. Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 609-23; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no. 3 (spring 1994): 384-427; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236-69; Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Elli Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry," Security Studies 4, no. 4 (summer 1995): 833-92.
29. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
30. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
31. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
32. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
33. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
34. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
35. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
36. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
37. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
38. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
39. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
40. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
41. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
42. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
43. The works which address theoretically or empirically reputations include Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Schelling, Arms and Influence; Stephen Maxwell, "Rationality in Deterrence," Adelphi Papers no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289-324; Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology & Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125-52; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
44. Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
45. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, chaps. 2-3.
46. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 2nd ed. (New York: Dorset & Baber, 1983), 1537.
47. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
48. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
49. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work."
50. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 1-2.
51. Prospect theory challenges the idea that risk-attitudes arc individually based and posits instead that the way in which decisions are framed is critical to understanding the risk propensity of decisionmakers. For a summary of this literature and applications to international politics, see Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding Lasses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor University of Michigan Press, 1994).
52. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chap. 2.
53. General deterrence refers to a policy which seeks to prevent a state from issuing a military threat to change the status quo, while immediate deterrence refers to a policy which attempts to prevent a state, which has already threatened force, from initiating the large-scale use of force.
54. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 55-56.
55. See, for example, R. Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (April 1992): 115-41; and Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World." Both authors are aware of the assumptions being made about reputations, and their analyses can be understood as attempts to check the arguments of Schelling and assess whether the conclusions reached by Schelling can be logically derived from a more formal model of deterrence.
56. See, for example, R. Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (April 1992): 115-41; and Nalebuff, "Deterrence in an Imperfect World." Both authors are aware of the assumptions being made about reputations, and their analyses can be understood as attempts to check the arguments of Schelling and assess whether the conclusions reached by Schelling can be logically derived from a more formal model of deterrence.
57. See Maxwell, "The Rationality of Deterrence," 19. I would also categorize scholars such as Jervis, The Logic of Images, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, as advancing arguments which give greater weight to case-specific determinants of credibility relative to reputational influences.
58. See Maxwell, "The Rationality of Deterrence," 19. I would also categorize scholars such as Jervis, The Logic of Images, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, as advancing arguments which give greater weight to case-specific determinants of credibility relative to reputational influences.
59. See Maxwell, "The Rationality of Deterrence," 19. I would also categorize scholars such as Jervis, The Logic of Images, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, as advancing arguments which give greater weight to case-specific determinants of credibility relative to reputational influences.
60. This second school of thought is, in large part, a more general critique of Schelling and his focus on the use of certain bargaining strategies to enhance deterrence credibility. The argument of Maxwell and George and Smoke is that Schelling fails to recognize that a potential attacker's assessment of the credibility of bargaining moves is linked to the underlying interests at stake for the defender, and that the willingness of defenders to adopt bargaining strategies are also shaped by the interests at stake and political constraints.
61. Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?" 882.
62. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 36-37.
63. For a discussion of the game theory literature on signaling games, see James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 8. Some applications of signaling games to international politics include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92; and James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 153-72.
64. For a discussion of the game theory literature on signaling games, see James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 8. Some applications of signaling games to international politics include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92; and James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 153-72.
65. For a discussion of the game theory literature on signaling games, see James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 8. Some applications of signaling games to international politics include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92; and James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 153-72.
66. For a discussion of the game theory literature on signaling games, see James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chap. 8. Some applications of signaling games to international politics include Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World"; James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577-92; and James D. Morrow, "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 153-72.
67. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chap. 2.
68. In addition, Mercer hypothesizes the opposite pattern of reputational inference about the allies of a potential attacker: Allies arc unlikely to develop reputations for having resolve while they can develop reputations for irresolution. This is another interesting implication of Mercer's theory, but I will not focus on this hypothesis since my concern is with Mercer's contributions to the role of reputations in deterrence theory, and in this literature primary attention is given to reputational inferences about adversaries.
69. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
70. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
71. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
72. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
73. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
74. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
75. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
76. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526;
77. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
78. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
79. Paul K. Huth and Bruce R. Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases From 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526; Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence; Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycler, Paul K. Huth, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 478-517; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes"; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work"; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
80. Huth and Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"
81. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chaps. 3-5.
82. Hopf, Peripheral Visions.
83. Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles.
84. Ibid., 149.
85. Ibid, 150-51.
86. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict"; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes."
87. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict"; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes."
88. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict"; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes."
89. See Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; and Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon.
90. See Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; and Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon.
91. See Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; and Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon.
92. See Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"; and Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon.
93. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chaps. 3-5.
94. Orme, Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles, 84-87.
95. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 80-81; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," 512; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," 618.
96. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 80-81; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," 512; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," 618.
97. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 80-81; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi, "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict," 512; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett, "The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes," 618.
98. Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, chaps. 3-5.
99. Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"
100. Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"
101. Shimshoni, Conventional Deterrence; Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate"; and Lieberman, "What Makes Deterrence Work?"
102. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
103. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
104. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
105. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
106. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
107. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
108. See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of World War I," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107; and Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," International Security 19, no. 4 (spring 1995): 65-93. Other important studies would include Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War 1: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," International Security 15, no. 3 (winter 1990/91): 187-215.
109. See, for example, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 4; and Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, chap. 6.
110. See, for example, Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 4; and Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, chap. 6.
111. See, for example, Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (November 1989): 941-72; David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Riview 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 512-33; and Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
112. See, for example, Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (November 1989): 941-72; David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Riview 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 512-33; and Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
113. See, for example, Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (November 1989): 941-72; David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Riview 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 512-33; and Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
114. See, for example, Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests"; James D. Morrow, "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve," American Journal of Political Science 33, no. 4 (November 1989): 941-72; David Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Riview 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 512-33; and Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
115. See Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 147-72; and Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," International Interactions 18, no. 2 (1992): 151-63.
116. See Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 147-72; and Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," International Interactions 18, no. 2 (1992): 151-63.
117. The original crisis dataset covered the period 1929 to 1979 and is summarized in Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, Crises in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, Handbook of International Crises (New York: Pergamon, 1988). An updated and revised dataset for the period 1919 to 1994 can be found in Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbon University of Michigan Press, 1997).
118. The original crisis dataset covered the period 1929 to 1979 and is summarized in Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, Crises in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, Handbook of International Crises (New York: Pergamon, 1988). An updated and revised dataset for the period 1919 to 1994 can be found in Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbon University of Michigan Press, 1997).