Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: Are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations?

Cognition

Volumn 136, Issue , 2015, Pages 49-63

  Cohen, Adam S ^a   Sasaki, Joni Y ^b   German, Tamsin C ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^b YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief reasoning; Domain specific; Functional specialization; Linguistic representation; Metarepresentation; Theory of mind

Indexed keywords

ACCURACY; ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; FEMALE; FUNCTIONAL DISSOCIATION; FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; HEALTH BELIEF; HUMAN; MALE; MENTAL HEALTH; MENTAL PERFORMANCE; NORMAL HUMAN; REACTION TIME; THEORY OF MIND; ADOLESCENT; COGNITION; IMAGINATION; PHYSIOLOGY; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

ADOLESCENT; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMANS; IMAGINATION; MALE; REACTION TIME; THEORY OF MIND; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84918785092     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.016     Document Type: Article

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